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The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount 
of  freely  available  field  data.  Moreover,  numerous  innovations  in  auction-design  features  on 
platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey 
the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of 
bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use 
of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-
auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).  
Section 1: Why do information systems make auctions (even) more popular? 
Long before any electronic information systems were in place, people used auctions to 
trade all kinds of goods and services.  In his comprehensive overview of the history of auctions, 
Cassady (1967) reports auctions of items of almost any size, from jewels and spices to ships and 
provinces.  The range of services that have been auctioned is also enormous, including anything 
from a dance on a local church festivity to the lifetime work force of a slave.  While being 
widespread, however, auctions were not the most common way of trading because the costs of 
conducting and participating in an auction were typically too high for the every-day trade of 
common goods.  Evidently, the use of auctions is subject to the trade-off between the advantage 
of price discovery (i.e. discovering the highest valuation bidder) and the disadvantage of having 
high transaction costs (i.e. the costs of finding a buyer and negotiating a sale).  Because of this, 
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auctions are most valuable when the party running the auction (both in buy and sell auctions) is 
very uncertain of the item’s market value and, thus, receives a considerable advantage from the 
price discovery through the auction. 
With the emergence and spread of electronic information systems, both the advantages and 
disadvantages  have  changed  radically.    On  one  hand,  the  transaction  costs  associated  with 
conducting and participating in an auction have decreased so substantially, that auctions seem 
worthwhile even when the expected advantage of detecting the true market value of the item is 
relatively  low.    On the  other  hand,  the  expected  advantage  of  price  discovery  has  increased 
sharply, because many more potential auction participants can virtually meet in an online auction 
house than at any physical location.  The effect is magnified by the fact that software agents in 
virtual auction houses enable participants to interact “on time” without having to be present in 
person.    The  time  and  space  emancipation  provided  by  electronic  information  systems  has 
increased the expected number of potential participants at an auction, making it more likely for 
the auctioneer to meet participants with especially high valuations. 
Since transaction costs have decreased and potential gains of trade have increased, it comes 
as no surprise that the volume of online auction trades has exploded ever since the service was 
first offered online.  Meanwhile, there is no doubt that online auctions constitute a major market 
with growing significance for the global economy. 
Not only size matters, for in addition to the significance of trade volume, online auctions 
have also taken a central role in market research and innovation.  No other economic institution 
has induced as much innovation and created as many research opportunities as online auctions 
have.  New features concerning the design of online auctions are proposed and discussed almost 
on a daily basis.  At the same time, the enormous amount of market data that is generated in 
online auctions and recorded electronically has enabled researchers to empirically address many 
issues that previously were not researchable.  Finally, the open access to online auctions has also 
opened a door for field experimentation that enables the research of controlled variations in a 
running market.  
In  this  chapter,  we  provide  an  overview  of  some  of  the  theoretical,  empirical,  and 
experimental research on online auctions.  The literature in this field is expanding so quickly that 
comprehensive coverage is impossible.  Nevertheless, we have tried to cover all major aspects of 
the research in the field with the one notable exception being the work on reputation in online   3 
auctions.  The reason for leaving out reputation in this chapter is that an entire other chapter of 
this book deals extensively with the issue of online reputation. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, some of the foundations of 
auction  theory  are  presented  for  the  simplest  case  of  single-object  auctions.   The  theoretical 
results are compared to experimental findings and related to empirical observations in online 
auctions.  In section 3, we discuss theoretical and empirical aspects of using public and secret 
reserve  prices  in  online  auctions.    Furthermore,  we  present  the  research  on  the  relationship 
between alternative reserve price instruments, such as minimum bids and shill bids.  In section 4, 
we present the research on late and incremental bidding in online auctions.  This research deals 
with the fact that in some online auctions the decisive bids are submitted within the last few 
moments.  An interesting aspect of this strand of research is that it is entirely motivated by 
phenomena that were first discovered in online auctions.  In section 5, we present the research on 
the buy-now option, which is widespread in online auctions, but rarely observed in classical 
auctions.  The buy-now option creates a hybrid market situation that allows bidders to choose 
between normal bidding or accepting a posted sale price.  While the buy-now option represents 
an outside option provided by the auction seller, in section 6, we examine parallel auctions and 
other seller provided options.  In section 7, we present the research on multi-object auctions that 
are both theoretically and empirically more difficult to deal with than the single-object auctions, 
and in section 8, we conclude the chapter with some general remarks on the design of online 
auctions.  
Section 2: Single-object auctions: theory and experiments 
Auction  theory  has  been  remarkably  influential  on  the  design  of  electronic  market 
mechanisms.  It has also motivated much of the empirical research on auction behavior that we 
are surveying in this chapter.  This section, together with our discussion of multi-object auctions 
in section 7, reviews some of the central theoretical and experimental results relevant to online 
auctions.
1  
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2.1 Standard auction mechanisms and models 
An auction elicits information, in the form of bids, from potential buyers regarding their 
willingness to pay.  The outcome – who wins and pays how much – is then determined based on 
this information.  In a single-object auction, one indivisible object is for sale.  There are four 
single-object auction types, which are widely used and analyzed both in theory and practice: the 
ascending-price  auction  (sometimes  called  English  auction),  the  descending-price  auction 
(sometimes called Dutch auction),
2 the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the second-price sealed-
bid auction (sometimes called Vickrey auction). 
The ascending-price auction is probably the best-known auction procedure: the price is 
raised until only one bidder remains.  This remaining bidder wins the object at the price at which 
the strongest competitor dropped out.  There are many ways to run ascending-price auctions: 
having the seller announce prices, the bidders announce prices, or the price continuously rising 
on a ‘price clock’.  In the latter version, which is the one we will refer to when we speak of 
ascending-price auctions, bidders can quit the auction at any price and observe other bidders 
quitting.  Because the price clock determines the price path, there is no possibility for bidders to 
speed up or slow down the auction process, or to employ ‘jump bids’ as a signaling device. 
The descending-price auction works in the opposite way: the auction starts at a high price, 
which a price clock then lowers.  The first bidder to call out his acceptance of the displayed price 
immediately stops the clock.  This bidder wins the object and pays the price at which the clock 
stopped.  Note that while in the ascending-price auction the winner pays a price determined by 
his strongest competitor (the price on the clock when the second-to-last bidder exits), the winner 
in the descending-price auction determines the final price (the price on the clock which he was 
the first to accept). 
In the first-price sealed-bid auction, bidders independently submit a single bid, without 
seeing the others’ bids.  There is no open, dynamic bidding.  The bidder who submits the highest 
bid wins and pays a price equal to his bid.  In the second-price sealed-bid auction, again the 
bidder who submits the highest bid wins, but here he pays a price equal to the second-highest bid. 
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In addition to the four types of auctions, there are two standard models of how bidders 
value an item: the private-value and the common-value model.  In the private-value model, each 
bidder  knows  the  value (his  maximum  willingness  to  pay)  that  he  assigns  to  the  object,  but 
different bidders may have different values.  For auctions to be a meaningful selling mechanism, 
the  seller  does  not  know  the  values  of  the  potential  buyers.
3  Furthermore,  there  is  typically 
asymmetric information among bidders: one’s value is private information to oneself.
4  Provided 
that there are no entry fees or other costs involved in bidding, the auction winner’s net gain is his 
value of the object minus the final auction price.  The losers’ net gain is zero since they neither 
get nor pay anything.  
In the common-value model, the value of the object is the same to all bidders, but bidders 
have different information about what is the actual value.  For example, the ‘true’ value of an 
antique statue may be very similar to all bidders, but bidders may get different ‘signals’ about 
whether the statue is genuine or a fake.  In such situations, bidders typically want to change their 
estimates of the value when they learn about the competitors’ signals.  In the private value model, 
on the other hand, bidders’ values are unaffected by learning the competitors’ information.  There 
are also more general modeling approaches, encompassing both special cases of private-value 
and common-value.  In these models, each bidder gets a private signal, and the value to the 
bidder is a function of all signals. 
2.2 Bidding behavior and auction outcomes in theory 
We begin with the private-value model.  In the ascending-price auction, it is a ‘dominant 
strategy’  to  stay  in the  auction  until  the  price  reaches  the  bidder’s  value.   That  is,  no  other 
strategy may yield a strictly higher expected payoff regardless of the competitors’ strategies.  It 
follows that the bidder with the highest value wins (the auction outcome is efficient).  The price  
paid by the winner (the auction revenue) equals the value of the strongest competitor, which is 
the second-highest value of all bidders. 
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In the second-price sealed-bid auction, a losing bid will determine the price.  Thus, a bid 
only affects whether the bidder wins or not, but not his payoff.  A bid equal to bidder’s value 
makes sure that the bidder wins if and only if the price is below his value, regardless of the 
strategies employed by the competitors.  Thus, bidding one’s value is a dominant strategy (as first 
observed by Vickrey (1961)).  It follows that, as in the ascending-price auction, the bidder with 
the highest value wins at a price equal to the value of the strongest competitor. 
The  first-price  sealed-bid  and  the  descending-price  auction  formats  are  strategically 
equivalent.  In the descending-price auction, each bidder decides on the price at which he plans to 
stop the auction.  This plan cannot be conditioned on other bidders’ bids, because the first bid 
immediately  ends  the  auction.    Similarly,  in  the  first-price  sealed-bid  auction  a  bidder  must 
submit a bid without knowing the competitors’ bids.  Furthermore, the winner pays a price equal 
to his bid, thus the outcomes of both auctions are equivalent. 
In contrast, bidding in the first-price sealed-bid and the descending-price auctions is more 
difficult than bidding in the other auctions.  The only way to make a strictly positive gain is to 
‘shade the bid’, that is to bid less than one’s value.  For example, in the simple case when the 
bidders know the values of their competitors, the bidder with the highest value will bid just above 
the second-highest value.  This ensures that he will win at the lowest possible price.
5  If values 
are  private  information,  however,  each  bidder faces  a  risk-return  trade-off.   The  equilibrium 
strategy then depends on what bidders believe about other bidders’ values, as well as their own 
risk attitudes.  The more competition he expects from other bidders or the more risk-averse is a 
bidder, the higher the optimal bid. 
To  be  more  specific,  let  us  assume  that  bidders  are  risk-neutral  and  that  values  are 
independent  draws  from  the  same  distribution, which  is  the  so-called  symmetric independent 
private-values model.  Then, in equilibrium, each bidder will bid his expectation of the value of 
his strongest competitor conditional on having the highest value (only in this case is the bid 
payoff-relevant).  As a result, the bidder with the highest value wins (the auction outcome is 
efficient).  The auction revenue is, on average, equal to the second highest value.  That is, under 
our assumptions, the descending-price and first-price sealed-bid auctions yield the same expected 
revenue  as  the  ascending-price  and  second-price  sealed-bid  auctions.    Bidders  adjust  their 
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behavior to changes in the auction rules in a way such that winners do not pay more than what 
they need to in order to win: the value of the strongest competitor.  This is the famous Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem by Vickrey (1961) that has later been generalized by Myerson (1981) and 
Riley and Samuelson (1981), among others.
6  
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem not only holds for the private-value model, but also for 
common-value  models,  if  the  signals  are  independent.    In  auctions  with  common-value 
components, however, bidding is more complicated because bidders must take into account that 
they run the risk of suffering from the winner’s curse.  Each bidder must recognize that (in 
symmetric equilibria) she wins only if she has the highest estimate of the value.  In this sense, 
winning the auction is bad news: it implies that all other bidders have information that led them 
to bid more cautiously, so that the winner would probably have revised her value downwards if 
she had access to competitors’ information.  The winner’s curse refers to the fact that winners 
may not anticipate this bad news that comes with victory.  They run the danger of systematically 
paying more, on average, than the actual value.  Of course, this cannot happen in equilibrium 
with rational bidding, where bidders would adjust their bids downwards. 
Outside the controlled laboratory and field experiments of the sort we survey in the next 
subsection,  the  theoretical  results  described  above  typically  do  not  directly  apply  to  online 
auctions, because the circumstances often differ from those assumed in the theory.  Bidders may 
be neither rational nor risk-neutral.  They may collude, endogenously enter the auction, or they 
may be asymmetric with respect to value distributions.  Sellers may employ reservation prices or 
impose  participation  costs.    The  same  or  competing  auctioneers  may  simultaneously  or 
sequentially sell substitutes or complements of the object.  There might also be technical risks 
involved in electronic bidding, and anonymous and geographically dispersed interaction in online 
auctions may create moral hazard and adverse selection issues.  We will address many of these 
complicating aspects later in this chapter, but first, the next subsection deals with empirical tests 
of the simple theory.  
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2.3 Bidding behavior in controlled laboratory and field experiments 
Auction experiments in the laboratory and in the field serve as a test of auction theory 
(Kagel 1995), as an empirical foundation of new approaches in behavioral game theory and other 
disciplines  concerned  with  economic  decisionmaking  (Camerer  2003),  as  a  test-bed  for 
alternative  auction  rules  (Roth  2002),  and  as  a  teaching  tool  (Asker  et  al.  2004).    Auction 
experiments  have  been  conducted  in  highly  controlled  laboratory  settings  to  reproduce  as 
accurately as possible the environmental assumptions of a given theoretical model.  Particularly 
in the online-auction era, field  experiments can also take place in more natural environments, 
increasing external validity and decreasing the amount of control by the experimenter. In this 
section,  we  concentrate  on  experimental  tests  of  simple  auction  theory,  focusing  on  those 
laboratory and field experiments most relevant to online auctions. 
While individual values for the auctioned object are typically unobservable in the field, 
they  can  be  controlled  in  experimental  settings  with  the  help  of  the  so-called  induced-value 
method (Smith 1976).  The trick is to sell money.  In a laboratory experiment, bidders compete to 
win  a  fictitious  good.  The  bidder  who  wins  the  good  may  subsequently  redeem  it  with  the 
experimenter for a specified amount of cash. This redemption value is typically different for each 
bidder. So, for example, a bidder with a value of $30 who wins the auction at a price of $21 will 
earn  a  cash  payment  of  $9  from  the  experimenter.    By  inducing  these  values  and  giving 
information  to  the  bidders  about  the  probability  distribution  of  other  subjects’  values,  the 
experimenter may impose the assumptions of a given theoretical model.  
Laboratory experiments with induced private values demonstrate that bidders tend to bid up 
to their values in ascending-price auctions, in agreement with theoretical predictions.  However, 
in first-price sealed-bid auctions,  bids are typically higher than predicted given the assumptions 
of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.  This overbidding is a robust effect observed in numerous 
experiments.    Bidder  risk  aversion  was  the  earliest  proposed  theoretical  explanation  for  this 
behavior,  but  this  theory  also  generated  quite  a  bit  of  skepticism;  see  the  comprehensive 
discussion in the survey by Kagel (1995).  More recent studies propose explanations based on 
emotions and bounded rationality. For example, the theoretical papers by Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
(1989) and Morgan et al. (2003) and the experimental papers by Ockenfels and Selten (2005) and   9 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2005) argue that  overbidding is consistent with concerns for 
relative  standing,  spite  or  regret.
7   Kirchkamp  and  Reis  (2004),  on  the  other  hand,  provide 
experimental evidence suggesting that overbidding is an artifact of laboratory testing, which often 
allowed over- but not underbidding on the whole value range. 
Laboratory experiments also found that, contradicting the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, 
open auctions generally raise less revenue but are more efficient than the equivalent sealed-bid 
auctions (Kagel 1995; see also Engelmann and Grimm 2004 for an analogous result in multi-unit 
auctions).  In particular, descending-price auctions typically raise less revenue than first-price 
sealed-bid  auctions,  and  bidders  in  second-price  auctions  often  overbid  with  respect  to  their 
dominant strategy and rarely underbid (Kagel and Levin 1993, among others).  However, recent 
experimental  studies  in  environments  that  are  closer  to  ‘naturally  occurring’  online  auction 
environments sometimes seem to qualify these findings. 
In  the  first  online-auction  experiment,  Lucking-Reiley  (1999)  auctioned  off  collectible 
trading cards over the Internet.  By going into the field, he sacrificed some control – e.g., he did 
not induce values, he allowed for endogenous entry etc. – in order to assess the predictive power 
of  the  theory  in  a  ‘real-world’  auction.    He  found  that  descending-price  auctions  earn 
approximately 30 percent more revenue than first-price sealed-bid auctions, which is inconsistent 
with both the Revenue Equivalence theorem and previous laboratory results. He could not find a 
significant difference between the ascending-price and the second-price sealed-bid formats, 
Other  experiments  exploit  the  fact  that  many  online  auction  platforms,  such  as  eBay, 
operate much like second-price auctions.  EBay asks the bidders to submit maximum bids (called 
“proxy bids”) and explains that "eBay will bid incrementally on your behalf up to your maximum 
bid, which is kept secret from other eBay users."  That is, once a bidder submits his (proxy) bid, 
eBay displays the currently winning bid as the minimum increment above the previous high 
proxy  bid.
8   At  the  end  of  the  auction,  the  bidder  who  submitted  the  highest  bid  wins  the 
auctioned item and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid plus the minimum increment..
9   
                                                             
7 Recent social comparison models such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) proved to be 
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9 If the second-highest bid plus one increment exceeds the highest bid, then the highest bidder pays his own bid.   10 
In the analysis that follows, we shall assume the minimum increment amount to be negligibly 
small. 
To understand the connection between the single-unit eBay auction and the second-price 
sealed-bid auction, assume for the moment that nobody learns about the proxy bids of other 
bidders until the auction is over.  Then, in fact, eBay becomes a second-price sealed-bid auction, 
in which each bidder has a dominant strategy to bid his value.  EBay explains the economics of 
second price auctions to their bidders along these lines, and extends the conclusion to its own 
auctions, in which bids are processed as they come in: “eBay always recommends bidding the 
absolute maximum that one is willing to pay for an item (…).”  Ockenfels and Roth (forthcoming) 
support  this  view  based  on  a  game-theoretic  analysis  of  a  continuous-time  model  of  eBay’s 
single-object  auction.    They  show  that,  while  there  is  no  dominant  strategy  in  eBay’s  open 
second-price format, strategies that involve bidding above one’s value are dominated, and that 
bidders ‘sooner or later’ will always bid their value.
10 
Garratt, Walker and Wooders (2004) investigated bidding behavior of eBay buyers and 
eBay sellers, experienced with eBay’s second-price rule, using induced values in a second-price 
sealed-bid auction experiment conducted on the Internet.  While even highly experienced eBay 
bidders tend to not bid exactly equal to their values, there was no greater tendency to overbid 
than to underbid as previously observed in laboratory experiments.  Furthermore, Garratt et al. 
found  that,  on  average,  subjects  with  selling  experience  on  eBay  bid  significantly  less  than 
subjects with only buying experience on eBay.  One important implication of this study is that 
background and experience with online auctions seems to affect bidding behavior. 
Ariely  et  al.  (forthcoming)  investigated  eBay  bidding  behavior  in  the  laboratory  by 
programming an experimental auction that emulated eBay’s central auction rules as described 
above.  In one study, they compared the performance of eBay’s open second-price auction format 
with an analogous second-price sealed-bid format.  For inexperienced bidders, they reported that 
the  median  sealed  bids  were  substantially  lower  than  in  the  open  auction.    Consistent  with 
previous laboratory studies, the open format results in more efficient outcomes, but inconsistent 
with previous results, the open format also yields higher revenues.  One reason for the better 
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auction model.   11 
performance of the open format is that learning in the sealed-bid auctions only takes place across 
auctions, while learning in the dynamic auctions also takes place within auctions.  For example, a 
bidder who imagines that he can win with a low bid does not learn that he is mistaken in a sealed-
bid auction until after the auction is over.  However, in open auctions, he can revise his bid as 
soon as someone outbids him.  For experienced bidders, Ariely et al. reported median final bids 
in both the sealed-bid and the open auctions that converge to the equilibrium prediction: 100 
percent of values. 
Ockenfels (2005) studied bidder behavior in a one-shot field experiment, using eBay as the 
experimental platform.  He invited eBay bidders through posters and email to register for online, 
eBay  experiments;  the  only  requirement  was  a  valid  eBay  account.    Bidders  were  privately 
informed about their induced values.  All communication and data collection were automated and 
via the Internet.  Due to the second-price rule employed by eBay, final bids should theoretically 
be  equal  to  induced  values.   Ockenfels  found that,  on  average,  the  losers’  final  bid  (eBay’s 
interface does not reveal the winners’ maximum bids) were indeed close to the induced values. 
Regarding  common-value  auctions,  laboratory  experiments  consistently  show  that 
inexperienced bidders are subject to the winner’s curse: on average, winners typically overpay 
(Kagel and Levin 2002).  Learning to avoid the winner’s curse appears difficult.  Ball et al. 
(1991) explored the winner’s curse in a bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information, 
and found virtually no adjustment to the winner’s curse over twenty trials (see also Grosskopf et 
al. 2003).  Kagel and Levin (1986) observed that experienced bidders in first-price, common-
value auctions can overcome the winner’s curse only with relatively few bidders, but succumb 
again with larger number of bidders.  Observe that a larger number of bidders heightens the 
winner’s curse problem – winning is worse news when there are more competitors who think the 
object is not worth the final price.  So, in theory, more bidders require further shading of bids, 
while, in fact, the subjects in the experiment by Kagel and Levin (1986) tended to bid more 
aggressively in larger bidding groups.  Kagel et al. (1995) replicated this finding in laboratory, 
second-price, common-value auctions.  Bidders again failed to respond in the right direction to 
more competitors.  
Given the laboratory evidence, it is reasonable to expect that the winner’s curse also plays a 
role in online auctions, because many online auctions have common-value components.  For one, 
online auctions often make it too costly for buyers to inspect in person the object being sold, so   12 
that an assessment of the ‘true’ condition of the object can be difficult and may vary across 
bidders, depending on the sources and quality of individual information.  Moreover, there is often 
a risk of being exploited by a fraudulent seller on C2C auction platforms.  Because bidders may 
differ with respect to their assessment of a seller’s trustworthiness, winning the auction may 
imply  bad  news  regarding  the  seller’s  intentions.   Finally,  online  auctions  often  attract  large 
numbers of potential bidders, which further amplifies the winner’s curse; winning an object on 
eBay means, in the extreme, that thousands of other users do not think that the object is worth its 
final price. 
A couple of papers looked for winner’s curse effects on eBay.  While direct evidence from 
field experiments supports the laboratory findings that winner’s curse effects are a real and robust 
phenomenon,
11 indirect statistical analyses of eBay data also support the view that bidders, to 
some extent, respond in a strategic way to take the risk of overpayment into account. 
Jin and Kato (2004, 2005) conducted a field experiment searching for the winner’s curse on 
eBay.    They  bid  on  eBay  auctions  for  upgraded,  baseball  cards,  and  then  let  a  professional 
grading service evaluate the cards.  They found that claims of high value result in more fraud (i.e., 
default or sending counterfeits) and no better card quality.  However, eBay buyers were willing to 
pay 23 to 54 percent more for cards that claimed quality of mint or better.  Overall, Jin and Kato 
concluded that some buyers have fallen prey to the winner’s curse by having underestimated the 
probability of fraud (see also Bajari and Hortacsu 2004 for a discussion of these findings).  A 
more indirect test by Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) relied on analyzing strategic bidding within a 
common-value auction model of eBay.  The model is a second-price, sealed-bid auction with an 
uncertain number of bidders.  The sealed-bid aspect of the model implies that no bidder can learn 
about  the  value  from  the  bids  of  others.
12   Using  field  data  of  collectible  coin  auctions  and 
applying various statistical instruments to account for the endogeneity of the number of bidders, 
the authors found that bids decline with the number of competing bidders.  This is in line with 
theory  but  inconsistent  with  laboratory  research.    Regarding  experience  effects,  Bajari  and 
Hortacsu found that experienced bidders are slightly more cautious.  On the other hand, Ow and 
                                                             
11 A related but distinct phenomenon is price dispersion: bidders often pay a higher price for an object than prices for 
an identical object offered at the same time by a different seller; see, e.g., Ariely and Simonsohn (2003) and the 
survey by Morgan, Baye and Scholton (2005) in this Handbook. 
12 The authors justify this modelling approach by noting that many bids are submitted in the last minute of the 
auctions.   13 
Wood  (2004)  reported,  also  based  on  a  field  study  of  rare-coin  eBay  auctions,  that  more 
experience leads to more aggressive bidding.  However, this is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the winner’s curse story put forward by Bajari and Hortacsu, since Ow and Wood argue that the 
winner’s curse effect is partly overlaid by an “initial lack of institution-based trust” that decreases 
with experience.  Other evidence in favor of rational reactions to winner’s curse effects comes 
from  survey  information  on  completed  eBay  auctions  by  Yin  (2005).    She  showed  that  the 
winning bid in a sample of eBay auctions is negatively correlated with the variance of the self-
reported, ex-ante estimates of the objects’ values.
13  That is, the more certain a bidder is of the 
item’s value, the more aggressively they bid. 
The data surveyed here suggest that auction theory and laboratory results are sometimes, 
but not always, a good predictor of online auction behavior.  For instance, auction theory has 
difficulties  capturing  overbidding  in  first-price  auctions  and  overpaying  in  common-value 
environments.    Field  behavior  seems  to  differ  from  laboratory  behavior  when  it  comes  to 
overbidding in second-price auctions and to experience and number effects in common-value 
environments.    Some  causes  for  these  discrepancies  suggest  themselves:  lack  of  bidder 
experience (Garrat et al. 1994); small decision costs and stakes (List and Lucking-Reiley 2002); 
uncontrolled  institutional  differences,  self-selection  and  subject-pool  effects;  and  presentation 
effects.
14  However, to date, there is too little research on the external validity of theoretical and 
experimental auction research.  One of the exceptions is Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), who had 
‘real’ experienced eBay traders interact in the ‘real’ eBay market, played out by eBay’s rules, and 
they do so with no sacrifice of control over theoretical predictions.  They are able to partly link 
the  behavioral  patterns  observed  in  their  controlled  experiments  on  eBay  both  to  behavior 
observed  in  fully  controlled  laboratory  experiments  and  to  behavior  observed  in  the  fully 
uncontrolled eBay market.  The data confirm laboratory results (predicted by social preference 
theory),  that  buyer  competition  yields  highly  competitive  results,  while  bilateral  trading 
environments yield more equitable outcomes, which are inconsistent with standard auction and 
                                                             
13 High  variances  occur  in  auctions  with  poorly  designed  web  pages  or  where  the  object  had  ambiguous 
characteristics.  
14 For the latter, observe for instance that eBay’s ‘proxy bidding’ explanation of second-price auctions (“… think of 
the bidding system standing in for you as a bidder at a live auction”) appears much more understandable than a 
typical  explanation  used  in  a  laboratory  experiment  (“You pay the amount of the second-highest bid -- i.e., the 
highest bid placed by any other participant in the auction.“)    14 
bargaining theory.  At the same time, the data show that a priori experience with eBay affects the 
sellers’ trading strategies in the field experiment.  It appears likely to us that, because online 
auctions allow “losing control in a controlled way” (Bolton and Ockenfels 2006), they will play 
an important role in investigating how laboratory and field behavior are linked to each other. 
Section 3: Reserve prices, minimum bids, and shill bids 
Superficially, it may seem that all activity in an auction comes only from bidders submitting 
offers,  while  the  seller  running  the  auction  simply  waits  and  hopes  that  the  auction  will  be 
profitable.  However, in addition to the initial choice of auction mechanism, the seller can also 
choose  a  reserve price  that  prevents  low-revenue  sales  and  stimulates  competition.    Strictly 
speaking, a reserve price defines the minimum amount that a seller will accept for the auction to 
end with a sale.
15  
The most straightforward behavior for the seller is to set a reserve price equal to her true 
willingness to accept and announce it at the outset of the auction.  In this case, the reserve price 
would serve to enhance efficiency, preventing the item from being sold if none of the buyers 
values it as highly as the seller.  However, the seller may also make strategic use of the reserve 
price by setting it higher than her willingness to accept.  The theoretical results discussed in the 
next subsection will show that optimal reserve prices are often – but not always – set strictly 
higher than the seller’s willingness to accept.  
In most online auctions, the seller may make a strategic choice not only of the amount of the 
reserve price, but also whether the reserve price should be secret or public and, if made public, at 
what point in the auction.  Finally, though this violates the formal rules of the auction game at 
eBay  and  most  other  online  auction  sites
16,  the  seller  may  effectively  camouflage  and 
dynamically adjust the reserve price during the auction by using shill bids, or bids covertly placed 
by the seller or by the seller’s confederates to artificially inflate the final sale price.  Clearly, any 
                                                             
15 For  convenience,  we  restrict  our  attention  to  the  case  where  the  auction  is  held  by  the  seller,  but  the  same 
discussion applies equally well (with obvious adjustments) to procurement auctions held by a buyer. 
16 Most online auctions explicitly forbid shill bidding on their sites. eBay, for example, writes: “Shill bidding is the 
deliberate use of secondary registrations, aliases, family members, friends, or associates to artificially drive up the 
bid price of an  item. (This  is  also known  as "bid padding.") Shill bidding is strictly forbidden on eBay. EBay 
members found shill bidding may receive warnings or indefinite suspensions of their accounts.” And: “Shill Bidding 
undermines trust in the marketplace since prices are being artificially manipulated. Furthermore, it is illegal in many 
locations throughout the world. To ensure  that buyers’ and sellers’  trust  in eBay’s marketplace is  appropriately 
placed, Shill Bidding is not permitted.”   15 
of these strategic options (or combinations thereof) may be used by the seller to increase the 
expected revenue from the auction. 
The  most  popular  type  of  reserve  price  used  in  online  auctions  is  the  minimum  bid 
(sometimes also called the opening bid or starting bid in dynamic auctions).  A minimum bid 
defines the lowest bid that a bidder may submit at the outset of an auction.  Because it is publicly 
announced before the auction begins and cannot be adjusted later, a minimum bid represents a 
static public reserve price. 
When the seller sets the minimum bid below her valuation, she often combines this strategy 
either with a secret reserve price or with shill bidding by the seller or a colluder.  Neither of these 
reserve-price variants are made public; in fact, shill bidding is a type of fraud.  However, both 
have similar effects to public reserve price: a trade only occurs if the final highest bid is above 
the secret reserve price or the shill bid.  The three instruments differ in their informational and 
dynamic aspects.  Secret reserve prices are fixed with the auctioneer before the auction starts.  On 
eBay and most online auction sites, bidders are informed that an auction has secret reserve, and 
whether or not it has yet been met by the bidding.  (In an interesting contrast, traditional, live 
auction houses like Christie’s and Sotheby’s do not inform bidders whether any secret reserve 
price has yet been exceeded.)   
By contrast with secret reserve prices, shill bids – like all bids in dynamic auctions – can be 
submitted and updated at any time during the course of the auction. Bidders are not informed of 
the presence of shill bidding, but obviously, they might guess that shill bidding is taking place.  
These differences in the informational and dynamic features are not only theoretically relevant, 
but in many countries also have legal consequences. It is important to note, however, that online 
shill bidding can be well organized (e.g. with a relatively large set of paid colluders, a rotating 
scheme with peer sellers, or through the use of a false online identity) and hard to detect.  The 
possibility  to  use  any  number  of  anonymous  online  identities  has  substantially  simplified 
undetectable shill bidding. 
 
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
A public reserve price can increase the revenue of a seller, both in the independent-value 
setting  (Myerson  1981,  Riley  and  Samuelson  1981)  and  in  the  affiliated  or  common-value   16 
settings (Milgrom and Weber 1982).  In the first case, the seller should choose a reserve price that 
maximizes his expected income by extracting the expected surplus from the highest bidder.  This 
optimal reserve price will typically be well-above the seller’s valuation.  Since the seller does not 
know the realized buyer valuations, the optimal reserve price will sometimes turn out to be higher 
than the highest bidder’s valuation, in which case no trade will occur.  Hence, analogous to the 
case of monopoly pricing, the optimal reserve price raises expected revenues for the seller but 
leads to inefficiency through reducing the quantity of trade.  A number of authors have argued 
that  this  inefficiency  cannot  persist,  because  it  entails  incentives  for  re-negotiations  and  re-
auctioning, unless the item is extremely perishable.  The modeling of post-auction resale leads to 
different conclusions about equilibrium auction outcomes and optimal reserve prices (Haile 2000, 
Zheng 2002). 
In the case of affiliated and common values, where bidders do not know their own values 
with certainty, the seller’s revenue will usually increase with a public reserve price.  Since the 
announcement of the reserve price may improve the bidders’ information about the true value of 
the auctioned item, the bidders can reduce their cautious bid shading and submit higher bids 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982).  At the same time, however, a public reserve price may reduce the 
amount of information available to the active bidders in an ascending bid auction.  Since in this 
case the bidders with signals below the reserve price cannot participate, their signal information 
is not revealed in their bids. 
The theoretical results mentioned above are based on the assumption of a fixed and known 
number of bidders, who incur no cost of entry.  When the number of bidders is endogenous (i.e. 
bidders can choose whether or not to participate) and bidders have some cost of entry, it may be 
advantageous  for  the  seller  to  set  the  reserve  price  no  higher  than  her  valuation  in  order  to 
encourage efficient levels of entry (Samuelson 1985, Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1987, McAfee and 
McMillan 1987, Levin and Smith 1994). 
The theoretical effects of secret reserve prices are also rather mixed.  The obvious market-
design question is whether the use of a secret reserve price is more beneficial than a public 
reserve  price  (minimum  bid).    Tatsuya  Nagareda  (2003)  models  a  second-price,  sealed-bid 
auction  where  the  seller  can  either  set  a  public  or  a  secret  reserve  price.    He  finds  that  no 
symmetric equilibrium exists in which secret reserve prices increase the expected revenue of the 
seller.  Other researchers, such as Elyakime et al. (1994) analyze an independent-value, first-price   17 
auction  and  conclude  that  a  seller  is  strictly  worse  off  using  a  secret  reserve  price  versus  a 
minimum bid. 
Not  all  theoretical  models  predict  a  disadvantage  to  secret  reserve  pricing.    Li  and Tan 
(2000) focus on risk-averse bidders rather than risk-neutral bidders.  The authors find that with 
risk-averse bidders, a secret reserve may increase the seller’s revenue in an independent, private-
value,  first-price  auction.    On  the  other  hand,  in  second-price  and  English  auctions,  risk 
preference does not play a role and the seller should be indifferent between a private or public 
reserve price.  The work of Vincent (1995) provides an example where setting a secret reserve 
price in an English or second-price auction can increase a seller’s revenue in an affiliated-values 
setting.  He argues that since a nonzero minimum bid can cause some bidders to avoid the auction 
entirely, the attending bidders will have less information than in an auction with a secret reserve 
price, but no minimum bid.  As usual, less information on other bidders’ signals in an affiliated-
values auction leads to more cautious equilibrium bidding and hence lower prices. 
With shill bidding, the informational situation is rather different than in the case of secret 
reserve prices.  For one thing, the bidders in such auctions receive no explicit notice that seller is 
effectively imposing a reserve.  Of course, in an institution in which shill bidding is possible, 
buyers may expect it to happen.  In fact, Izmalkov (2004) shows that in an English auction with 
asymmetric independent private values, there exists an equilibrium with shill bidding that has an 
equivalent outcome to that of Myerson’s (1981) optimal mechanism.  The intuition for this result 
is  best  described  by  Graham  et  al.  (1990  and  1996),  who  show  that  setting  a  reserve  price 
dynamically, that is after having observed some bidding, can increase the seller’s revenue.  The 
effect is due to the fact that the longer the seller can observe bidding in the auction, the more 
precise becomes the seller’s information buyers’ values.  In the absence of penalties for shilling, 
the seller should weakly prefer an adjustable reserve price (e.g. a shill bid) to an ex-ante fixed 
reserve price.  
Similar, more detailed results for the independent-private-value ascending auction are shown 
by Sinha and Greenleaf (2000) and Wang et al. (2004).  For example, Sinha and Greenleaf’s 
discrete-bidding model shows that the advantage to the seller of shilling depends on a number of 
parameters, including the number of active bidders and their “aggressiveness” as well as the 
sequence of buyer and shill bids.  They find that, in some cases, sellers should optimally refrain   18 
from  shill  bidding  and  credibly  commit  to  their  abstinence.    This  commitment  ensures  that 
bidders shade their bids less than when they fear shill bidding occurs. 
Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) derive a similar result for the case of dynamic shill 
bidding  in  a  common-value  setting  with  an  ascending  auction.    Their  model  uses  a  pool  of 
bidders who are only able to see a binary signal for the value of the good (high or low).  They 
show that as a seller increases his rate of shill bids, while holding bidder behavior constant, he 
increases  his  selling  price,  since  common-value bidders  infer  higher  item  value from  greater 
participation.    However,  since  bidders  guess  that  the  seller  will  employ  shill  bidding,  they 
decrease the amount of their bids, which lowers the final sale price.  Furthermore, when the seller 
happens to win his own auction with a shill bid, he must pay a fee to the auctioneer without 
actually making a sale.  If these two negative effects outweigh the potentially higher selling price, 
the seller would prefer to commit to a policy of no shill bidding.  However, the seller has a 
credibility problem with committing to not shill, because in any auction where bidders do not 
believe shill bidding is occurring, a seller has a clear incentive to shill in order to increase the 
final price.  Given the seller’s lack of credibility, bidders should always believe that shill bidding 
will occur and lower their bids accordingly. 
Finally, some features unique to online auctions make shilling behavior more attractive to the 
seller.  Engelberg and Williams (2005), for example, argue that dynamic shill bidding is strongly 
supported by eBay’s system of “proxy bidding” to approximate a second-price auction.  The 
bidder with the highest bid in an eBay auction is called the “high bidder” and holds the “current 
bid” that usually is equal to the next highest proxy bid plus a fixed bidding increment.  One 
important exception is that if the proxy bid of the high bidder is not large enough to provide a full 
minimum increment over the second-highest bid, then the current bid is set to exactly the value of 
the high bidder’s proxy bid.  In that event, the second-highest bidder can infer that the high 
bidder’s proxy bid amount has just been reached.   
Engelberg and Williams point out that this feature of eBay’s rules facilitates a “discover-and-
stop”  shilling  strategy.
17   They  observe  that  most  bidders  enter  bids  of  whole-  or  half-dollar 
amounts, so a particularly effective shilling strategy would place bids with unusual decimal parts, 
for example, making all shill bids end in 37 cents.  Continuously increasing the shill bid by the 
                                                             
17 Shah et al. (2002) describe a similar pattern of “uncovering” behavior, without the special eBay details.   19 
minimum bid increment up to the point in which the current bid is no longer increased by the full 
amount of the minimum bid increment, allows sellers to squeeze the full value of the item from 
the  highest  bidder,  while  minimizing  the  chances  of  winning  the  auction  and  receiving  no 
revenue.  For example, suppose that the high bidder has submitted a proxy bid of $7.50 and that 
the minimum bid increment is 50 cents.  The seller first submits a shill bid of $5.37, which results 
in eBay showing the high bid as $5.87.  He continues with a series of shill bids increasing in one-
dollar steps: $6.37, $7.37.  At this point, the system reports a current bid of $7.50 instead of $7.87, 
revealing the high bidder’s maximum bid to be exactly $7.50.  At this point, the shill bidder stops, 
extracting the bidder’s full willingness to pay, without risking overbidding the true bidder and 
failing to sell the item.  Engelberg and Williams (2005) conjecture that a bidder’s best response to 
this discover-and-stop shill strategy is one of sniping, or withholding their true bid until the last 
seconds before the closing of the auction (see Section 4).
18 
Overall, it seems clear that the theoretical predictions concerning the different variants of 
reserve prices depend on many details.  Clearly, all of the reserve-price variants can, under some 
circumstances, increase the seller’s revenue.  However, the rational reaction of the buyers often 
involves increased bid shading.  As the sellers become smarter in their effort to uncover bidder’s 
valuation information, bidders should become ever more cautious about revealing information in 
their  bids.  Hence,  empirical  and  experimental  work  is  needed  to  assess  the  actual  economic 
impact of reserve prices and to compare the effects of different reserve-price strategies.    
 
3.2 Empirical and experimental observations 
Many of the theoretical results concerning public and secret reserve prices depend on the 
details of the models used.  The effects of reserve prices are especially sensitive to theoretical 
assumptions  about  the  information  and  valuations  of  bidders.    While  the  empirical  and 
                                                             
18 In an environment without proxy bidding, Kirkegaard (2005) discovers a related theoretical result: bidders may 
wish to submit jump bids as a defense against shilling. By mixing jump bids and normal bids, bidders obscure the 
information  about  their  willingness-to-pay,  making  dynamic  shilling  less  effective.    Note  that  proxy  bidding 
precludes jump bidding, because a single bidder can’t cause the current bid to jump above the second-highest bid; 
someone wishing to execute a real jump bid on eBay would have to use two different bidder accounts.  Note also that 
Kirkegaard uses the term phantom bidding, which is technically distinguished from shill bidding because the former 
refers to  the auctioneer making up a non-existent (i.e. “phantom”) bid, while  the  latter refers to the seller or  a 
confederate actually placing a bid with the auctioneer.   20 
experimental research we introduce in this subsection provides some help in sorting out and 
matching the appropriate models and auction situations, we will also see many questions left 
open for further research. 
 
3.2.1 Entry and revenue effects of public and secret reserve prices 
Although details may differ, there are a few predictions that are shared by all theoretical 
models.  These basic predictions are amongst the earliest studied in the field.  The first basic 
hypothesis  is  that  reserve  prices  (whether  public  or  secret)  should  lead  to  a  decrease  in  the 
number of bids and the number of bidders in an auction.  The second hypothesis is that the 
number of auctions ending without a trade should increase when reserve prices are used.  What 
overall effect these two observations have on average prices (i.e. revenues) depends on the details 
of the theory used.  
An early test of these hypotheses was performed by Reiley (2006).  In his field experiment, 
collectible trading cards from the game “Magic: The Gathering” were sold in first-price, sealed-
bid auctions on Internet newsgroups.  The size of the minimum bid (public reserve price) was 
varied systematically as a fraction of each card’s book value, or reference price .  The main 
results  of  the  experiment  are  consistent  with  the  basic  hypotheses  above:  holding  all  other 
variables  constant,  the  use  of  a  public  reserve  price  (1)  reduces  the  number  of  bidders,  (2) 
increases the frequency with which goods go unsold, and (3) increases the revenues received on 
the goods conditional on their having been sold.  Furthermore, bidders clearly exhibit strategic 
behavior in their reactions to the public reserve prices.  High-value bidders, for example, raise 
their bids above the reserve in anticipation that rival bidders will do the same. 
Ariely and Simonson (2003) study eBay auction prices for tickets to the 2000 Rose Bowl (a 
popular, American, collegiate football game).  They found that the minimum bid and the total 
number of bids have a positive correlation to the price.  Unfortunately, the authors do not report 
the interaction between the minimum bid and the number of bids.  According to the first basic 
hypothesis and given the evidence from the other empirical studies, we should expect that the 
number of bids will depend on the value of the minimum bid and cannot simply be viewed as an 
exogenous parameter.  In fact, in a follow-up field experiment on VHS, DVD, CD, and Book 
sales on eBay reported in the same paper, the authors observe that bidder activity and the number   21 
of bids submitted were greater for a low minimum bid than for a high one.  This clearly indicates 
that activity measures such as the number of bids should be treated as endogenous parameters in 
empirical work on auctions. 
With  their  field  experiment,  Ariely  and  Simonson  (2003)  show  that  there  is  another 
exogenous parameter that may affect the market activity level and may interact with the effect of 
the minimum bid on prices.  This exogenous parameter is a measure of the amount of supply by 
other sellers.  When many sellers are offering identical (or very similar) items at the same time,
19 
then auctions with both high and low minimum bids end at roughly the same price.  Thus, a high 
degree of supply by other sellers reduces the effect of the public reserve price.  By contrast, when 
there are few other sellers offering the same item, a high minimum bid yields empirically higher 
auction prices.  Note that this effect is not in line with standard auction theory.  In a standard 
auction model, we would expect high seller-side competition to lead to a lower number of bidders 
per auction.  This, in turn, should make the use of a public reserve price more valuable to the 
seller, because it helps to drive up the price especially in “thin” markets.  Hence, standard auction 
theory would predict the greatest difference between auctions with low and high minimum bids 
when seller-side competition is high.  The authors explain their results by claiming that the low 
seller-side competition reduces the probability that bidders compare competing auctions and, thus, 
enables the minimum bid in each auction to be a much more effective psychological “anchor” for 
the bidding behavior. 
The anchoring hypothesis finds some support in the field and laboratory auction experiments 
reported by Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2003).  In their field experiments, they auction 
identical postage stamps, while systematically varying the minimum bid, and the shipping and 
handling costs.  They find that the total selling price substantially increases with the minimum 
bid and the fixed cost of shipping.  The effect seems especially strong when the true value of the 
item is harder to estimate.  However, an external reference point does not alleviate the effect.  
  Hossain and Morgan (2006) conduct eBay field experiments for Xbox games and music 
CDs, systematically varying the shipping costs.   They find that for Xbox games, setting a low 
minimum bid and a high shipping cost yields more revenue than doing the reverse.  Buyers do 
not seem to take the extra shipping cost as much into account as the stated minimum bid in the 
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auction.  They do not discover the same effect for music CDs; when the shipping costs were a 
substantial fraction of the item’s selling price, the bidders took shipping costs into account just as 
much as minimum bids.   These results are consistent with psychological anchoring effects being 
present but limited in scope.   
 Anchoring can obviously be effective only with public reserves, not secret ones.  Hence, if 
the anchoring hypothesis is true, we should expect to observe a greater correlation between a 
public reserve price and the auction outcome, than between a secret reserve price and the auction 
outcome.  Unfortunately, we know of no study so far, that systematically varies the amount of the 
secret  reserve  price.    There  are,  however,  a  number  of  studies  comparing  public  and  secret 
reserve prices. 
In an early empirical study, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) examined the effects of minimum 
bids and of secret reserve prices in all 407 auctions for mint and proof sets of U.S. coins that 
occurred on eBay during a week in late September of 1998.  Only 14% of the observed auctions 
used a secret reserve, with the average book value of these items being more than 20 times higher 
than the average of items without a secret reserve.  While 84% of the items without a secret 
reserve  sold,  only  49.1%  of  the  items  with  a  secret  reserve  sold.    Surprisingly,  the  average 
number of bidders for auctions with a secret reserve was substantially higher (5.0) than in the 
other auctions (2.8).  This correlation disappears when the confounding effect of item value is 
taken into consideration: high-value items generally induce more bidding activity, and are also 
more likely to have secret reserves.  However, these high-activity auctions are also associated 
with lower bids relative to book values.  Overall, the results suggest that a secret reserve has less 
of an entry-deterring effect than a public reserve, but a secret reserve does have a positive effect 
on revenue.  Hence, the authors suggest that a combination of a low minimum bid and a secret 
reserve  is  likely  to  be  the  optimal  configuration  from  a  seller’s  point  of  view,  especially  in 
auctions of high-value items. 
Dewalley and Ederington (2004) also analyzed eBay auctions to measure the impact of secret 
reserve prices on bidding strategies and final auction prices.  Their data on 5,275 auctions of 
classical Silver Age comic books was gathered in 2001 and 2002.  Unlike Bajari and Hortaçsu 
(2003), they find clear statistical evidence that the use of a secret reserve reduces the number of 
active bidders in an auction and, thus, has a negative impact on the seller’s revenue.  This result is 
strongly supported and extended by Katkar and Reiley (2005), who report on a field experiment   23 
in which they auctioned on eBay 50 matched pairs of Pokémon trading cards.  One card of each 
pair was auctioned with a minimum bid, while the other was auctioned with an equivalent secret 
reserve price.  On average, the secret-reserve auctions return 10% less revenue and are more than 
30% less likely to end in a sale. 
 
3.2.2 Auction fever 
Auction fever is one of the most frequently discussed issues concerning online auctions.
20  In 
general, auction fever is thought to be an excited and competitive state-of-mind, in which the 
thrill of competing against other bidders increases a bidders’ willingness to pay in an auction, 
beyond what the bidder would be willing to pay in a posted-price setting.  Since auction fever 
supposedly  derives  from  the  thrill  of  competition,  one might reasonably  expect  the  effect  to 
increase with the number of active bidders.  This theory may explain why some auctioneers 
prefer a low minimum bid, perhaps lower even than the auctioneer’s true willingness to accept. 
The  low  minimum  bid  would  attract  as  many  bidders  as  possible,  in  an  attempt  to  promote 
auction fever.  (In case auction fever is insufficient, shill bidding could prevent the item being  
sold below the seller’s reservation price.) 
It is important to note that auction fever (sometimes also referred to as competitive arousal, 
bidding frenzy, or bidding war) generates a diametrically opposite prediction to both the standard 
auction-theoretic  argument  for  reserve  prices  and  the  anchoring  hypothesis  described  above.  
While  those  imply  that  installing  a  high  public  reserve  price  will  increase  seller’s  revenues, 
auction fever predicts that a low public reserve price will create a more competitive atmosphere, 
which in turn leads to bidders’ arousal, higher bids, and higher auction revenues. 
Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2004) run a series of experiments in which they vary the 
frequency  of  bid  arrivals  and  the  perceived  total  number  of  active  bidders  in  order  to  find 
evidence for auction fever.
21  They find both parameters to have positive, significant effects on 
                                                             
20 In many of its ads, eBay actually advertises with an image of aroused bidders enjoying the thrill of bidding and the 
joy of winning.  
21 To be able to manipulate these parameters in a controlled manner, Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2004) let each 
subject play against bidding robots that are programmed to create each treatment environments. In order not to 
disturb the emergence of auction fever, the authors mislead their subjects to believe that they are bidding against 
   24 
revenues, indicating that auction fever may be effectively pushing up prices.  No such effect is 
observed when bid increments and time pressure are varied.   
Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2005) explore field and survey data of online and offline 
auctions  to  look  for  evidence  for  competitive  arousal.    The  survey  results  seem  to  provide 
evidence for auction fever.  In addition to the evidence for auction fever, the authors also find 
evidence of overbidding due to an attachment effect, which is when long bidding durations and 
other sunk costs intensify the desire to win the auction, leading to increased revenues for the 
seller.  Both effects are also observed in a controlled laboratory experiment, in which the sunk-
cost parameter and the number of bidding rivals was varied. 
Heyman, Orhun, and Ariely (2004) also examine these two phenomena of competition and 
attachment.  They use the term “opponent effect” to describe the arousal due to competing with 
others and the term “quasi-endowment” for increased valuation due to having been attached to 
the item as the high bidder over a long period.  In two experiments, one comparing different 
hypothetical  scenarios,  and  one  examining  real  transactions  in  the  laboratory,  they  vary  the 
number of rival bids and the duration of quasi-endowment (i.e. time spent as the high bidder).  
Both an increase in the number of rival bids and an increase of the duration of quasi-endowment 
have a positive effect on the final price.  The authors conclude that sellers may be able to increase 
revenues by increasing the total auction duration and by lowering the minimum bid in order to 
induce more ”feverish” bidding. 
The evidence to date suggests that auction fever may be a real phenomenon.  This implies 
that sellers might be able to increase revenues by setting very low minimum bids in order to 
increase the number of active bidders; however, that prediction has not yet been tested directly.
22  
These studies also report somewhat higher bids from those bidders who were the high bidder for 
a longer duration (and hence would have more opportunity to become “attached” to the item). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
other human players. Strictly speaking, it is not clear to what extent subjects from a subject pool that has been 
exposed to deception in experiments, will actually believe any part of the information that they are given.   
22 Reiley  (2006)  presents  some  evidence  along  these  lines  in  field  experiments  involving  first-price  sealed-bid 
auctions: realized prices were slightly higher with no minimum bid than with a minimum bid at 20% of book value.  
However,  “auction  fever”  typically  refers  to  ascending-bid  auctions  where  bidders  can  observe  the  number  of 
competitors, not to sealed-bid auctions where the number of competitors is uncertain.   25 
3.2.3 Shill bids 
Identifying shill bids in field data is an extremely difficult task, even though most online 
auction sites provide detailed bid-history information for every auction.  The most crucial issue is 
that  online  identities  are  easily  created  and  cannot  be  tracked  back  to  the  physical  identities 
without inside information, nor is it easy to prove collusion among legitimate seller identities.  
This means that, in theory, a seller can create any number of online buyer identities and have 
them bid on the items auctioned.  Obviously, creating online identities is not free of cost: at the 
very least, the seller will incur opportunity and effort costs.  In practice, this means that sellers 
who shill will have some incentive to try to minimize the number of fake identities they use to 
cover up the shill bidding.  But even with a small number of fake online identities, identifying the 
connection  between  a  seller  and  the  seller’s  confederates  remains  a  difficult  empirical  task.  
Proving such a connection is even more difficult. 
Some authors have presented clever approaches to this difficult problem.  Kauffman and 
Wood (2003) gathered data from eBay auctions of rare coins.  Their central instrument for the 
detection of shill bidding consists of the search for “questionable bids,” meaning bids that appear 
to be strictly dominated from the bidder’s point of view, but could be rationalized as a seller’s 
shill bid.  Kauffman and Wood (2003) consider the following criteria to detect questionable bids: 
(1) there are two auctions of identical items at about the same time, where auction A ends before 
auction B; (2) the questionable bid is placed in auction B, even though an equal or lower bid in A 
would have been the highest bid in A; (3) the bidder who submitted the questionable bid in B, did 
not bid in A.  Clearly, a buyer who places such a questionable bid could have done better by 
submitting a lower or equal bid to auction A, which terminates earlier than B. 
Since questionable bids might appear for reasons other than shill bidding, Kauffman and 
Wood introduce additional requirements for identifying shill behavior.  The criteria for detecting 
shill bids consist of: (1) shill bids are questionable bids; (2) shill bids are submitted by buyers 
who  concentrate  their  bidding  on  the  auctions  of  very  few  unique  sellers;  (3)  shill  bids  are 
submitted earlier than average; (4) shill bids increase the current bid by more than the average 
bid; (5) shill bids are less likely to win the auction than the average bid.  Of the more than 10,000 
auctions examined by Kauffman and Wood (2003), 622 auctions (i.e. 6%) met their criteria for 
shill bidding.  The authors also find that the probability of observing shill bidding in an auction 
increases when the minimum bid is relatively low, when the book value of the item is higher,   26 
when  the  auction  duration  is  relatively  long,  and  when  the  seller’s  other  auctions  appear  to 
feature  shill  bidding.   In  a  second  paper,  Kauffman  and  Wood  (2005)  show  that  when  they 
identify an auction as having a shill bid, that auction tends to yield a higher price. 
In another empirical study of shill bidding, Engelberg and Williams (2005) concentrate on 
finding evidence for the discover-and-stop technique described above.  They examine almost 
40,000 event-ticket auctions on eBay in September 2004, collecting additional information about 
the other auctions participated in by the buyers and sellers in that sample. In their 40,000 auctions, 
they find that 3% of all bids are discover-and-stop bids
23, and estimate that half of these, or 1.5%, 
are intentional shill bids.  They also find that when bidders bid frequently on the same seller’s 
auctions, the observed bids are more likely to be discover-and-stop shill bids.
24 
Hoppe and Sadrieh (2006) take a completely different approach than those of the empirical 
studies.  They conduct a field experiment in which they auction blockbuster-movie DVDs and 
collectible-coin bundles.  They auction three copies of each item simultaneously in three different 
treatments: (1) an auction with the minimum bid set to the lowest possible value, (2) an auction 
with the minimum bid set to about 60% of the book value, and (3) an auction with the minimum 
bid set to the lowest possible value, but with a later shill bid at about 60% of the book value.  
Both the literature on auction fever and the notion of avoiding the auctioneer’s reserve-price fee 
suggest that the last treatment with the shill bid should result in the highest seller profit.  In fact, 
the experiment shows that sellers in online auctions may have good reasons to use this latter 
setup.  Although the observed prices are indistinguishable between treatments, seller profits are 
significantly higher in the two treatments with low minimum bids, because those strategies avoid 
paying additional fees for setting a high public reserve price.  Interestingly, the effects are very 
similar no matter whether the auctioned item is in a “thick” market (blockbuster DVD) or in a 
“thin” market (unique collector’s bundle). 
                                                             
23 Engelberg and Williams define a discover-and-stop bid to be a bidder who bids twice, incrementally, within 10 
minutes, and stops bidding as the second-highest bidder with evidence that the high bidder’s bid is less than one 
increment higher. 
24 Shah et al. (2002) use data-mining  techniques, on 12,000 eBay auctions of video-game consoles, to  look for 
suspicious  relationships  between  buyers  and  sellers,  finding  evidence  suggestive  that  sellers  often  use  multiple 
pseudonyms  or  confederates  to  execute  their  shilling.    They  point  out  the  possibility  of  a  shilling  strategy  of 
“unmasking,” similar to Engelberg and Williams’ discover-and-stop strategy, and propose (but do not execute) an 
analysis similar to that later performed by Engelberg and Williams.   27 
Hoppe and Sadrieh (2006) observe no additional bid shading in the auctions with a shill bid; 
bidders in this environment would have no idea which auction (if any) involved shill bidding. By 
contrast, Kosmopoulou and De Silva (2005) verify the theoretical prediction of Chakraborty and 
Kosmopoulou  (2004),  that  providing  the  subjects  with  knowledge  about  confederate  bidding 
would induce them to increase their bid shading.  In their laboratory experiment, subjects first 
participated in a number of ascending-price auctions without bid shilling, before the sellers were 
allowed to participate in bidding.  Once the ability of the seller to participate was announced, the 
bidders’ bid levels dropped, and average seller profit dropped from 97.5% to 88.9% of the item 
value.  These findings highlight the seller’s dilemma:  sellers make more profit when there is no 
possibility  of  shilling,  yet  they  always  have  an  incentive  to  shill  when  bidders  believe  that 
shilling is not taking place.  Once a seller’s ability to shill is recognized by the bidders, bid levels 
drop, regardless of whether shill bids can actually be observed. 
To summarize the results on shilling, we note that experimental research has shown that shill 
bids are effective tools for sellers in ascending-bid auctions, and that shill bids allow sellers to 
increase profits merely by escaping reserve-price fees.  However, theory and experiments also 
suggest that sellers might be better off if the auctioneer could find some way to guarantee the 
absence of shill bidding. Empirical analysis suggests that shilling probably takes place in more 
than 1% but less than 10% of eBay auctions.  EBay could probably reduce the rate of shilling not 
only by tracking close relationships between certain buyer and seller usernames, but also by 
changing its bidding system to thwart the discover-and-stop shilling strategy.   For example, one 
possible  remedy  would  be  to  eliminate  the  kinds  of  odd-number  bids  most  effective  in  the 
discover-and-stop strategy, requiring all bids to be an even multiple of the current bid increment.  
Enforcement  of rules  against  shilling  can  be  quite  tricky,  especially  as  sellers  become  more 
sophisticated: a new service called XXLSell.com now provides a service (at least to German-
speaking  online-auction  sellers)  that  automates  the  process  of  shilling,  apparently  using 
thousands of other XXLSell members’ usernames to execute the shills in a way that is more 
difficult to detect.
25  
                                                             
25Thanks to Henning Krieg for pointing out this interesting new development to us.    28 
Section 4: Late and incremental bidding 
Many researchers found that bids on eBay, where auctions run typically for a week, often 
arrive very near to the closing time – a practice called “sniping”.  For instance, in the sample of 
computer and antiques auctions with at least two bidders, Roth and Ockenfels (2002) found that 
about 50 percent of all auctions still have bids in the last five minutes, 37 percent in the last one 
minute, and still 12 percent in the last 10 seconds.  Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) found that 32 
percent of the bids in their sample are submitted after 97 percent of the auction has passed.  
Anwar  et  al.  (2004)  noted  that  more  than  40  percent  of  the  bids  in  their  eBay  sample  are 
submitted during the final 10 percent of the remaining auction time.  Simonsohn (2005) reported 
that in his sample almost 20 percent of all winning bids are placed with just one minute left in the 
auction, and Hayne et al. (2002) reported that bidding in the last minute occurs on average in 25 
percent of their sample of 16,000 auctions.  Regarding the whole distribution of the timing of 
bids, Roth and Ockenfels (2000) and Namazi (2005) observed that bid-submission times on eBay 
follow a power-law distribution with most bids concentrated at the closing time.  Shmueli et al. 
(2005) added that the start of an auction also sees an unusual amount of bidding activity.
26  
At first glance, last-minute bidding of this sort cannot easily be reconciled with economic 
theory.  As explained in section 2, eBay makes available a software bidding agent, called “proxy 
bidding,” to make bidding simple for bidders without having to be constantly vigilant or online at 
the close of the auction.  As a consequence, not the last bid (as in ascending-price auctions) but 
the highest bid wins, regardless of submission time.  Furthermore, there is a risk involved in late 
bidding in online auctions.  Because the time it takes to place a bid may vary considerably due to 
erratic internet traffic or connection times, last-minute bids have a positive probability of coming 
in too late (after the close of the auction).
27 eBay explains the simple economics of second-price 
auctions  and  the  risks  involved  in  late-bidding  and  comes  to  the  conclusion:  “eBay always 
                                                             
26 There appear to be differences with respect to sniping frequencies across countries. Wu (2004) noted that there is 
much less sniping on eBay’s Chinese platform Eachnet. However, one might speculate that Eachnet was not as 
mature as other platforms at the time of the study; the feedback score of most bidders was zero, and there were 
almost no competing auctions. Hayne et al. (2003a) reported that in their sample bidding occurs in the last minute of 
an auction with, for instance, 12 percent probability in United Kingdom and 36.5 percent probability in Sweden. 
27 In a survey of 73 bidders who successfully bid at least once in the last minute of an eBay auction, 63 replied that it 
happened at least once to them that they started to make a bid, but the auction was closed before the bid was received 
(Roth  and Ockenfels 2002). Human and  artificial bidders do not differ in this respect. The last-minute bidding 
service esnipe.com, which offers to automatically place a predetermined bid a few seconds before the end of an eBay 
auction, acknowledged that it cannot make sure that all bids are actually received on time by eBay.   29 
recommends bidding the absolute maximum that one is willing to pay for an item early in the 
auction. (…)  If someone does outbid you toward the last minutes of an auction, it may feel unfair, 
but if you had bid your maximum amount up front and let the Proxy Bidding system work for you, 
the outcome would not be based on time.”  
However,  Ockenfels  and  Roth  (forthcoming)  demonstrated  within  an  auction  theoretic 
model that sniping on eBay could be a best response to a variety of strategies.  In particular, 
inexperienced,  “naïve”  bidders  might  mistake  eBay’s  proxy  system  for  an  ascending-price 
auction, and thus continually raise their bids to maintain their status as the high bidder.  In an 
eBay style auction that closes at a predetermined deadline (‘hard close’), bidding very late might 
be a best response to 'incremental bidding' (or multiple bidding) of this sort.  That is, bidding very 
near the end of the auction would not give the incremental bidder sufficient time to respond, so a 
sniper competing with an incremental bidder might win the auction at the incremental bidder’s 
initial, low bid.  In contrast, bidding one’s value early in the auction, when an incremental bidder 
is present, would win the auction only if one’s value were higher than the incremental bidder’s, 
and in that case one would have to pay the incremental-bidder’s value. 
Late bidding may also be a best response to other incremental bidding strategies for private-
value model environments.  One of these strategies is shill bidding by confederates of the seller in 
order to push up the price beyond the second-highest maximum bid.  Barbaro and Bracht (2005), 
among others, argue that bidding late may protect a bidder from certain shill bidding strategies.  
Engelberg and Williams (2005) demonstrates how shill bidders may use incremental bids and 
eBay’s proxy-bid system to make bidders pay their full valuations. 
An additional reason for rational late bidding is given by Rasmusen (2003), where multiple 
bidding is caused by uncertainty over one’s own private valuation (see also Hossain 2006).  He 
argues within a game-theoretic model that bidders are ignorant of their private values.  Thus, 
rational bidders may refrain from incurring the cost of thinking hard about their values until the 
current price is high enough that such thinking becomes necessary.  Note that this, in turn, creates 
incentives for bidding late, because it prevents those incremental bidders from having time to 
acquire more precise information on their valuation of the object being auctioned. 
Another rational reason for incremental bidding is that bidders may be reluctant to report 
their values, fearing that the information they reveal will later be used against them (see Rothkopf,   30 
Teisberg and Kahn 1990).  While the highest maximum bid is kept secret on eBay, it sometimes 
happens that the winner defaults and that then the seller contacts the bidder who submitted the 
second-highest bid.  If this bidder revealed his value during the auction, the seller can make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer squeezing the whole surplus from trade.  By bidding incrementally,  private 
information can be protected – but only at the risk that a sniper will win at a price below one’s 
value.  Other papers refer to emotional factors as explanations for incremental bidding, such as 
‘auction fever’ (Heyman et al. 2004), escalation of commitment and competitive arousal (Ku et al. 
2005).  Another explanation along these lines is the ‘pseudo-endowment effect’ (Wolf, Arkes and 
Muhanna 2005), which posits that temporarily being the high bidder during an auction increases 
the  bidder’s  value.    Note  that  not  only  is  late bidding  a  good  strategy  to  avoid  incremental 
bidding wars with other emotional bidders, but also that late bidding may also serve as a self-
commitment strategy to avoid how one’s own bids are affected by auction fever and endowment 
effects. 
The evidence in the laboratory and the field indicates that incremental bidding is common, 
and that sniping is likely to arise in part as a response to incremental bidding.  Wilcox (2000) 
indicates that the average bidder submits 1.5 to 2 bids.  Ockenfels and Roth (forthcoming) report 
that  38  percent  of  the  bidders  submit  a  bid  at  least  twice.    Among  these  bidders,  the  large 
majority  submits  a  new  bid  after  being  outbid.   In  particular,  53  percent  of  the  last  bids  of 
incremental bidders are placed after the previous bid was automatically outbid by eBay’s proxy 
bidding  agent  (i.e.,  by  another  bidder's  proxy  that  was  submitted  earlier  in  the  auction),  34 
percent are placed after the previous bid was outbid by a newly submitted proxy bid of another 
(human or artificial) bidder, and only 13 percent are placed by the current high bidder (so that the 
current price is not changed).  Bids per bidder increases with the number of other bidders who bid 
multiple times in an auction, which suggests that incremental bidding may induce bidding wars 
with  like-minded  incremental  bidders.
28   In  a  regression  study  using  eBay  field  data,  Wintr 
                                                             
28 They also note that naive English-auction bidders may also have an incentive to come back to the auction close to 
the deadline in order to check whether they are outbid. However, the data indicate that among those bidders who 
submit a bid in the last ten minutes of an eBay auction, one-bid bidders submit their bid significantly later than 
incremental bidders. The data also reveal that bidders with a larger feedback score tend to submit less bids per 
auction, suggesting that incremental bidding is reduced with experience. However, in a study by Hayne et al. (2003) 
the bidders who submitted multiple bids had a higher average feedback score than the average for all bidders.   31 
(2004) found that the presence of incremental bidders leads to substantially later bids, supporting 
the view that sniping is reinforced by incremental bidding. 
Ariely et al. (forthcoming) investigated the timing of bids in a pure private-value laboratory 
setting.  They observed that early bids are mostly made in incremental bidding wars, when the 
low bidder raises his bid in an apparent attempt to gain the high bidder status, while late bids are 
made almost equally often by the current high bidder and the current low bidder.  That is, late 
bids appear to be planned by bidders regardless of their status at the end the auction. 
Incremental bidding is not the only possible cause for late bidding.  Roth and Ockenfels 
(2002) and Ockenfels and Roth (forthcoming) demonstrate that there can be equilibria where all 
bidders submit only one bid late in the auction, even in purely private-value auctions and even 
though this risks failing to bid at all.  This kind of equilibrium can be interpreted as collusion 
against the seller, because it has the effect of probabilistically suppressing some bids, and hence 
giving higher profits to the successful bidders.  Several researchers tested the implications of the 
model,  but  the  model  could  generally  not  be  supported.    Using  eBay  field  data,  Bajari  and 
Hortacsu (2003) could not statistically confirm whether early bids lead to higher final prices.  
Hasker et al. (2003) as well as Wintr (2004) could not find evidence that the distribution of final 
prices is different for winning snipes and winning early bids on eBay.  In a controlled field 
experiment,  Gray  and  Reiley  (2004)  found  2.54  percent  lower  prices  when  the  experimenter 
submitted the bid just 10 seconds before the end of the auction compared to when the bid was 
submitted several days before the end, though the difference was not statistically significant.  
Finally, in their laboratory study, Ariely et al. (forthcoming) found that when the risk of sniping 
is removed, the amount of late bidding goes up.  This evidence also contradicts the ‘implicit 
collusion’ explanation, for late bidding should decrease when there is no chance of suppressing 
bids through sniping.  However, most of the studies reported substantial amounts of multiple 
bidding.  This again suggests that parts of the sniping behavior can be interpreted as a response to 
incremental bidders.  
Another explanation for incremental bidding without positing inexperience on the part of 
the  bidders  is  to  note  that,  if  an  auction  is  common-value  rather  than  private-value,  bidders 
receive information from others’ bids that causes them to revise their willingness to pay.  In 
general, late bids motivated by information about common values arise either so that bidders can 
incorporate into their bids the information they have gathered from the earlier bids of others, or   32 
so  bidders  can  avoid  giving  information  to  others  through  their  own  early  bids.  Bajari  and 
Hortacsu (2003) formalize this idea in a symmetric common value model; Ockenfels and Roth 
(forthcoming) give an example of equilibrium sniping in a simple common-value model with 
asymmetrically informed bidders. 
Roth  and  Ockenfels  (2002)  provides  survey  evidence,  and  Ockenfels  and  Roth 
(forthcoming)  provides  field  evidence  which  supports  the  common  value  explanation.    They 
show that there is less last-minute bidding on eBay computer auctions than on eBay antiques 
auctions, which supposedly possess more common value elements.  However, the fact that Ariely 
et al. (forthcoming) observed substantial sniping in the laboratory for a pure private-value context 
strongly suggests the common-value explanation that bids are interpreted as value signals does 
not entirely explain the motivations for sniping behavior. 
Another direction for explaining late and multiple bidding is based on the multiplicity of 
listings of identical objects, which may create incentives to wait until the end of an auction in 
order to see how prices develop across auctions.  Peters and Severinov (forthcoming) propose a 
model with simultaneously competing auctions and argue that late bidding is consistent with this 
model.  Stryszowska (2005a; see also 2005b) models online auctions as dynamic, private-value, 
multi-unit auctions.  By submitting multiple bids, bidders coordinate between auctions and thus 
avoid bidding wars.  In one class of Bayesian equilibria, multiple bidding also results in late 
bidding, even when late bids are accepted with probability smaller than one.  Wang (2003) shows 
theoretically that in a twice–repeated eBay auction model, last-minute bidding is in equilibrium 
and offers some field evidence for this.  Anwar et al. (2004) provide evidence suggesting that 
eBay  bidders  tend  to  bid  across  competing  auctions  and  bid  on  the  auction  with  the  lowest 
standing bid.  This seems to support the idea that the incentives to bid late are amplified when 
there  are  multiple  listings  of  the  same  item.    However,  it  is  somewhat  surprising  how  little 
empirical work on competing online auctions has been conducted.
29 
Some observers of eBay believe that the amount of sniping will decrease over time because 
it  is  mainly  due  to  inexperience  and  unfamiliarity  with  eBay’s  proxy  bidding  system.    This 
                                                             
29 Two other studies (Zeithammer 2004, and Arora et al. 2003) theoretically and empirically study bidding behavior 
in sequential online auctions but they do not address the issue of bid timing within a given auction. Vadovic (2005) 
studies dynamic auctions in which bidders coordinate who searches for outside prices and shows that bidders with 
low search costs tend to bid late.   33 
section showed, however, that there are a variety of rational, strategic reasons for sniping.  It is a 
best response to naïve and other incremental bidding strategies, and can even arise at equilibrium 
in both private-value and common-value auctions.  In fact, Wilcox (2000), Roth and Ockenfels 
(2002),  Wintr  (2004),  and  Ariely  et  al.  (forthcoming)  observed,  both in  laboratory  and  field 
studies, that more experienced bidders snipe more often than less experienced bidders.
30  Thus, as 
long  as  the  auction  rules  remain  unchanged,  it  seems  likely  that  late  bidding  will  remain  a 
persistent phenomenon on eBay. 
Section 5: The buy-now option 
A  feature  of  online  auctions  increasing  its  share  of  market  transactions  is  the  buy-now 
option.  This option, also known as buyout option allows any bidder to end the auction early at a 
buy-now price previously specified by the seller.  When a bidder exercises a seller’s buy-now 
option, he pays the specified price (some authors prefer to call this price the buy-out price or the 
buy price), in order to receive the item immediately and shut out other bidders. On eBay, the buy-
now price is called the Buy it Now price, whereas on Yahoo it is called the Buy price.  The buy-
now option used by eBay and Yahoo differ by more than just the name.  The Buy-it-Now option 
on eBay is a temporary buy-now option, available only so long as no bid has yet been placed on 
the  item.
31   The  Buy-it-Now  option  disappears  after  the  first  bid.   In  contrast,  the  Buy-price 
option on Yahoo is a permanent buy-now option and available for the entire duration of the 
auction.  Other online auctioneers use these options as well: a survey by Matthews (2005) shows 
that temporary buy-now options are available on eBay, LabX, and Mackley & Company, whereas 
Yahoo, uBid, Bid or Buy, MSN, and Amazon offer permanent buy-now options.
32  The practice 
appears to be much more common in the online world than in traditional English auctions.   We 
are not aware of any documented use of buy-now prices in traditional auctions, perhaps because 
live auctions usually take place on much smaller timescales (seconds versus days). 
                                                             
30 Simonsohn (2005) investigated the consequences of such lateness on the strategic behavior of sellers. The idea is 
that because many bidders snipe, an auction’s ending-time is likely to influence the number of bidders it receives. In 
fact, he found that a disproportionate fraction of sellers set the ending-time of their auctions to hours of peak-demand. 
31 If the seller has set a secret reserve price, the Buy it Now option remains active until the reserve price is overbid. 
32 This practice developed even before commercial auction websites.  Lucking-Reiley (2000a) documents the use of 
“buyout prices” in English auctions run by individuals on online newsgroups before the advent of eBay.   34 
The buy-now option has become increasingly popular with sellers.  According to Matthews 
and Katzman (2006), of the items for sale on eBay, 30% were listed with a buy-now option in the 
first quarter of 2001 and 35% in the second quarter of 2001.  By December 2001, 45% of items 
for sale on eBay were listed with a buy-now option.  Hof (2001) generally agrees with these 
findings, reporting that about 40% of the items for sale on eBay had the buy-now option towards 
the end of 2001.  Kane (2002) reports that in the second quarter of 2002, 33% of eBay items 
listed worldwide had the buy-now option and accounted for 19% of gross merchandise sales.  
The economic relevance of the buy-now option can easily be seen in eBay’s quarterly reports.  
The  reports  for  2005  show  that  eBay’s  fixed-price  sales,  consisting  largely  of  Buy-it-Now 
purchases, accounted for $3.2 billion (30% of the gross merchandise sales) in quarter 1, $3.2 
billion (29%) in quarter 2, $3.4 billion (32%) in quarter 3, and $4.0 billion (34%) in quarter 4. 
The existence and increasing popularity of the buy-now option are puzzling from the point 
of view of auction theory.  An auction’s primary benefit is that it relieves the seller of the job of 
determining an item’s price, instead allowing bidders to determine the price by competing with 
each other.  Introducing a buy price could potentially decrease a seller’s revenue, because when 
exercised it rules out the possibility of higher prices reached by competitive bidding.  If exercised 
by a bidder with less than the highest value, the buy price can similarly reduce efficiency. Given 
the potential inefficiency and loss of revenue, why is the buy-now option so popular with sellers? 
5.1 Explaining the buy-now option with risk-aversion 
One of the first proposed explanations for the observed popularity of the buy-now option is 
the  risk  aversion  of  bidders  or  sellers.  Budish  and  Takeyama  (2001)  show  that  adding  a 
permanent buy-now option to an ascending auction can increase the seller’s revenue, in a model 
with two risk-averse bidders with only two possible valuations.  Reynolds and Wooders (2003) 
extend the result to a continuous uniform distribution of valuations, demonstrating that it holds 
for both types of buy-now options.  They show that optimally chosen buy-now prices are never 
exercised in equilibrium when the bidders are risk-neutral.  In contrast, when the bidders are risk-
averse, the optimal buy-now prices are exercised with a positive probability, providing insurance 
value to risk-averse bidders and increasing the risk-neutral seller’s revenue. 
Though a buy price may in principle allow a lower-value bidder to shut out the highest-
value  bidder,  Hidvégi,  Wang  and  Whinston  (2006)  show  that  in  ascending  auctions  with  a   35 
permanent  buy-now  option  and  uniformly risk-averse  bidders,  such  displacement  of  the  high 
valuation bidder will not occur in equilibrium.  Intuitively, with a permanent buy-now price set 
optimally by the seller, no bidder immediately jumps to the buy-now price.  Instead, bidders with 
valuations that are high enough to accept the buy-now price will first engage in straightforward 
bidding  until the  current  bid  level  has  reached a  certain  threshold.   If  bidding  reaches  some 
bidder’s threshold, that bidder ends the auction by accepting the buy-now price.  Assuming all 
bidders have exactly the same degree of risk aversion, their thresholds decrease monotonically in 
their valuations (i.e. the bidder with the highest valuation will be the first to jump to the buy-now 
price).  This monotonicity of threshold values ensures an efficient outcome of the auction, and the 
optimally chosen buy price yields at least as much expected revenue as an auction without a buy 
price.
33 
Hidvégi, Wang and Whinston (2004) note that their efficiency and neutrality results break 
down if the permanent buy-now option is replaced by a temporary buy-now option.  Temporary 
buyout options do not allow for the type of threshold strategies discussed above.  Both efficiency 
and seller revenue are lower than in an auction with a permanent buy price.  Permanent buy 
prices also produce higher revenues than temporary buy prices in the risk-averse-bidder model of 
Reynolds and Wooders (2003) and the impatient-bidder model of Gupta and Gallien (2005).  
Using a slightly different approach and focusing on a temporary buy-now option, Mathews 
and  Katzman  (2006)  show  that  buy-now  prices  may  increase  expected  utility  for  risk-averse 
sellers facing risk-neutral bidders. The intuition here is simply that a risk-averse seller may be 
willing to give-up part of the expected auction revenue to reduce the volatility of auction revenue.  
In an extreme case, an infinitely risk-averse seller can choose a buy-now price low enough for 
even the lowest-valued buyer type to accept.  This guarantees immediate trade at a fixed price.  A 
seller  with  less  extreme  risk  aversion  will  choose  a  higher  buy-now  price,  earning  higher 
expected revenues with nonzero variance. The buy price produces higher expected utility for the 
seller even though it may result in an inefficient allocation. 
                                                             
33 Interestingly, the risk-averse bidders in this model do not receive higher expected utility from the presence of a 
buy-now price. Though they receive some benefit from reduced uncertainty, the seller manages to extract the added 
bidder surplus with an optimally chosen buy-now price. 
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5.2 Explaining the buy-now option with impatience and other transaction costs 
An alternative explanation for the prevalence of the buy-now option is the impatience of the 
trading agents.  An impatient bidder may be willing to pay a premium to receive the item quickly.  
Similarly, an impatient seller may be willing to accept a lower price to end the auction early.  
Indeed, eBay cited impatience as a reason for introducing the Buy-it-Now price (Dennehy, 2000).  
Mathews (2003) studies both bidder and seller impatience in an independent-private-valuations 
auction with a temporary buy-now option.  He shows that impatience on either side of the market 
creates incentives for the seller to set a buy-now price that would be exercised with positive 
probability.  The optimal buy-now price increases directly with bidders’ impatience, inversely 
with seller’s impatience, and inversely with the number of bidders. 
Gupta and Gallien (2005) also examine the case of “time sensitive” (i.e., impatient) bidders 
in an independent-private-value auction with bidders arriving at the auction via a Poisson process.  
In  addition  to  comparing  temporary  and  permanent  buy-now  options,  they  investigate  the 
theoretical possibility of a “dynamic” buy-now price whose level can be changed by the seller 
during the course of the auction. The authors first solve for the Nash equilibrium in the bidders’ 
strategies for each of the auction formats, then use numerical simulations to derive results on the 
optimal seller choice.  The results show that a dynamic buy-now price barely improves seller 
utility compared to a static one, which perhaps explains the lack of dynamic buy prices observed 
in the field.  The simulations also show that a permanent buy-now option can enhance revenues 
far more than temporary buy-now option can.
34 
In the models discussed so far, impatience makes auction participation costly for a bidder 
relative  to  a  fixed-price  purchase.  Wang,  Montgomery,  and  Srinivasan  (2004)  suggest  that  a 
consumer may have other substantial transaction costs associated with participation in an auction.  
Amongst others, they describe the cognitive effort that is necessary to observe, plan, and execute 
the bidding in an auction.
35  In the presence of these bidder transaction costs, buy prices produce 
benefits similar to those derived in the above models of bidder impatience. 
   
                                                             
34 Interestingly, the model also predicts increased late bidding when a permanent buy price exists.  This result is 
related to the fact that the auction price approaches the permanent buy price towards the end of the auction. 
35 See Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) for additional discussion of auction entry costs.   37 
5.3 Explaining the buy-now option with a sequence of transaction opportunities 
An  alternative  explanation  for  the  observed  frequent  use  of  buy-now  prices  in  online 
auctions rests on the idea that sellers may use them to optimize revenues intertemporally when 
identical units of the item come up for sale at different points in time. Kirkegaard and Overgaard 
(2003), for example, examine a sequence of single unit auctions, run either by the same seller or 
by multiple sellers.  In the latter case, the first seller can increase her revenues and decrease the 
revenues of the subsequent sellers by choosing the optimal temporary buy-now price.  In the 
former case, when the seller is a monopolist, the optimal strategy prescribes not to use the buy-
now option for the first auction, but to announce its use for later auctions.  Thus, the buy-now 
price in this model is a valuable instrument to the seller even though all agents are risk-neutral 
and no one is impatient. 
Etzion, Pinker, and Seidmann (2003) describe a similar result for the case of a multi-unit 
seller who faces a stream of randomly arriving bidders and can sell any number of items either in 
unrestricted auctions or with a permanent buy-now price.  The seller uses both mechanisms to 
effectively  price  discriminate  between  buyers  with  low  versus  high  willingness-to-pay.    The 
former  would  earn  negative  surplus  at  the  buy-now  price,  so  they  merely  participate  in  the 
auction. The latter, who could earn positive surplus at the buy-now price, generally do not do so 
immediately: they bid in the auction at first, and only later consider accepting the buy-now price. 
In a closely related model, Caldentey and Vulcano (2004) derive a similar equilibrium with a 
more complex model of bidders’ utility. 
Many online auctions represent clearance sales of overstock items.  That is, both on eBay 
and on merchandise sites such as uBid.com, auctions take place for items that failed to sell at a 
posted price in ordinary sales channels.  Obviously, if buyers rationally expect the possibility of 
purchasing an item in a later overstock auction, that might affect their initial purchase decision. 
Note that this possibility can be modeled as a multiple-item auction with a temporary buy-now 
price.    If  all  items  sell  immediately  at  the  buy-now  price,  no  auction  takes  place,  but  any 
“leftover” items are sold at auction. 
Bose  and  Daripa  (2006)  analyze  this  scenario.    They  model  buyers’  valuations  rather 
unconventionally:  A  buyer  either  has  a  pre-specified  high  valuation  or  a  valuation randomly 
drawn from a continuous distribution strictly lower than the high valuation. The seller’s problem 
is to price discriminate by making the buy-now option attractive enough to the high-value buyers   38 
so that they do not wish to wait for the auction. Bose and Daripa show that the seller cannot 
perfectly price discriminate; the optimal mechanism involves a temporary buy-now price set low 
enough to be attractive to some of the low-valuation buyers as well. 
5.4 Empirical and experimental evidence 
The  growing  body  of  alternative  theoretical  explanations  calls  for  empirical  and 
experimental testing.  Some preliminary research is available, but much work remains to be done, 
both on drawing out the testable implications that might distinguish the competing theories, and 
on collecting empirical data to test them.  
The earliest empirical studies of buy-now prices have mainly generated descriptive data 
about the practice.  Mathews (2003), for example, reports the prevalence and execution of the 
buy-now option in two specific product categories on eBay (software for the Sony PlayStation).  
He finds the buy-now option available for more than half of the items (59%).  The option was 
exercised in about 27% of the cases in which it was available.  In about 62% of these cases, the 
buy-now price was below the auction price. 
Reynolds and Wooders (2003) also provide frequencies with which the buy-now option has 
been used on eBay and Yahoo.  They sample a total of 31,142 eBay auctions and 1,282 Yahoo 
auctions in the categories of automobiles, clothes, DVD-players, VCRs, digital movie cameras, 
and TV-sets. 40% of eBay auctions used the temporary Buy-it-Now option, while 65%  of Yahoo, 
auctions used the permanent Buy-Price option.  Since the permanent buy-now option of Yahoo is 
chosen more frequently than the temporary buy-now option of eBay, this gives some empirical 
support to those theories predicting that the permanent buy-now option may be more beneficial 
for sellers than the temporary option. 
Durham, Roelofs, and Standifird (2004) examine a sample of 138 auctions of American 
silver dollars on eBay. They find that the 41 auctions using a buy-now price (temporary since it is 
on  eBay)  result  in  significantly  higher  selling  prices  (on  average  $10.27)  than  the  auctions 
without a buy-now price (on average $9.26).  From these findings, the authors conclude that the 
buy-now option increases seller revenue, consistent with the idea that there are some risk-averse 
or impatient bidders willing to pay a premium to guarantee a win or end the auction early. 
Anderson, Friedman, Milam, and Singh (2004) collected data on about 1000 Palm Pilot Vx 
auctions on eBay.  The goal of the study is to identify and relate typical seller profiles to typical   39 
seller strategies.  One of the most interesting findings is that the high-volume sellers typically use 
a buy-now price in combination with a very low minimum bid.   
Hendricks, Onur, and Wiseman (2005) analyze data from almost 3,000 Texas Instruments 
TI-83 Graphing Calculator auctions on eBay, where 831 (roughly 30 percent) offered a buy-now 
price.  The auctions with buy-now prices appeared to produce significantly higher revenue than 
the  auctions  without  buy-now  prices.    However,  by  contrast  with  the  behavior  of  the  high-
volume sellers studied by Anderson et al., a great majority of the auctions with a buy-now price 
also featured a high minimum bid, 90% or more of the buy-now price.  Because the buy-now 
auctions also tended to have higher minimum bids than the non-buy-now auctions, it is hard to 
tell whether the cause was the buy-now price or the higher minimum bid (see Section 3)..  
A  number  of  studies  have  used  experimental  methods  to  study  the  buy-now  option. 
Standifird, Roelofs, and Durham (2005) report a field experiment in which they auctioned 84 
American  Eagle  silver  dollars  on  eBay  to  study  the  impact  of  varying  buy-now  prices. 
Surprisingly, they find that eBay buyers hardly made use of the buy-now option, even when the 
buy-now  price  was  substantially  below  the  prevailing  market  price.  The  authors  suggest  that 
buyers may be reluctant to use the buy-now option, in order not to forfeit the entertainment 
benefit associated with the participation in an eBay auction. 
Shahriar and Wooders (2005) report laboratory experiments examining whether sellers can 
profitably use the buy-now option in independent-private-value auctions with risk-averse bidders.  
Common value auctions, in which the buy-now option theoretically creates no advantage, are also 
examined in a control treatment.  The authors find that suitably chosen buy-now prices raise 
sellers’ revenues in both treatments.  They speculate that the unexpected positive effect of the 
buy-now price on the sellers’ revenues in the common-value treatment may be due to winner’s-
curse-type overbidding.   
Using  a  similar  experimental  design,  Seifert  (2006)  reports  a  strong  interaction  effect 
between the market size and the revenue impact of a temporary buy-now option.  The experiment 
shows that buy-now prices have the expected positive impact on sellers’ revenues with five active 
bidders, but the effect is lost when the number of active bidders falls to three. 
All  in  all,  the  buy-now  option  remains  rather  poorly  understood.    We  see  few  robust 
findings, and little ability to discriminate between the different proposed theoretical explanations.    40 
As a relatively new economic phenomenon, the buy-now option clearly remains an area in with 
many opportunities for exciting empirical research. 
Section 6: Parallel markets and other outside options 
Before the advent of electronic markets, most auctions took place as fairly isolated events.  
The items sold in an auction were often not easily available elsewhere, at least not at feasible 
time and travel costs.  Furthermore, bidders were constrained to being at one auction at a time 
and usually could not bid on several auctions in parallel.
36  In general, the only alternative for a 
bidder, who did not receive the item in an auction, was to wait for a subsequent auction.  Hence, 
early  auction  literature  has  been  fairly  extensive  on  sequential  auctions
37,  but  has  almost 
completely ignored settings in which bidders can simultaneously participate in multiple auctions 
or use other sales channels to purchase the item.  In such settings, the seller in an auction is no 
longer a monopolist, but faces competition by the sellers in other auctions or markets.  The 
bidders do not only have an entry choice, as in isolated auctions with endogenous entry decisions, 
but have an outside option in the alternative sales channel. 
To see the empirical relevance of online auctions with parallel markets, it suffices to start 
up any Internet browser and open one window on a typical online auction (e.g. eBay or Yahoo!) 
and another window on a typical shopbot (e.g. mysimon.com or shopping.com).  For hundreds of 
products, there are numerous auctions running in parallel and numerous online shops offering 
fixed price sales at the same time.  Auction sellers are often in a highly competitive environment 
that is substantially different from the monopoly position they are assumed to have in classical 
auction theory.  Buyers must choose the type of market (e.g. auction or posted offer), the specific 
instance of that type (which auction or which posted offer), and – if necessary – the bid to submit.  
These are all more complicated strategic decision situations than those that have typically been 
studied in the auction theory literature. 
The fact that the strategic interaction quickly turns overly complicated, when competition 
and  outside  options  are  added  to  the  standard  auction  models,  has  limited  the  amount  of 
                                                             
36 Telephone bidding clearly presented the first step towards bidder presence at multiple auctions. However, since 
telephone bidding is quite costly and only a small portion of all bidders use it, the auctioneers often plan their 
auctions in a way to reduce parallel auctions of the same category of goods.   
37 See the overviews in Klemperer (1999) and Krishna (2002).   41 
theoretical work on the topic.  McAfee (1993) shows that equilibria in games in which sellers 
compete  by  offering  different  direct  mechanisms,  may  not  be feasible  in  general,  due  to  the 
possible non-convexity and discontinuity of the sellers’ profit functions.  However, under some 
restrictive assumptions, McAfee (1993) shows the existence of an equilibrium in which all sellers 
offer second-price auctions with the reserve prices set to their marginal cost. 
Peters and Severinov (1997) use a limit equilibrium concept to explicitly characterize the 
symmetric equilibrium that arises when the seller’s competition is restricted to choosing only 
amongst auctions (instead of choosing any arbitrary direct mechanism).  The author’s approach 
also allows them to examine the efficiency aspects of the auction competition equilibria.  They 
show that the efficiency of the auction competition market depends on the seller’s ability to 
advertise his reserve prices and on the timing of the buyers’ knowledge of the own valuation.  An 
efficient market performance, in the analyzed setting, is achieved when sellers can advertise their 
reserve prices and buyers learn about the realization of their valuation only after having chosen a 
specific auction.  If buyers are informed of their valuations before they select an auction, the 
reserve prices are driven down to the sellers’ marginal costs and there is inefficiently excessive 
entry.  All these results, however, are derived under the restrictive symmetry assumption that 
buyers  randomize  their  purchases  over  all  sellers  who  offer  the  same  conditions.    This  is  a 
restrictive  assumption;  it  excludes  all  possible  equilibria  in  which  buyers  systematically  sort 
amongst sellers.  
Building  on  the  two  studies  discussed  above,  Peters  and  Severinov  (forthcoming) 
characterize a dynamic adjustment mechanism that provides a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a 
market where sellers compete by offering different reserve prices in their independent ascending 
second-price auctions.  Buyers bid in multiple rounds, costlessly and independently adjusting 
their  bids  and  moving  from  one  auction  to  the  other,  whenever  their  previous  bid  was  not 
successful.  The perfect Bayesian equilibrium derived for this decentralized trading institution 
induces an efficient set of trades at a uniform trading price.  
The strength of this equilibrium is that the decentralized equilibrium bidding has extremely 
low informational requirements and neither depends on a buyer’s beliefs about the other buyers’ 
valuations, nor on the number of buyers and sellers.  The equilibrium bidding rule only requires 
that any buyer, who currently does not hold a high bid, should bid in the auction with the lowest 
current high bid, raising the high bid as slowly as possible and exiting the market if the calculated   42 
next bid is greater than one’s valuation.  This minimal increment bidding is a feasible strategy for 
most of the existing online auctions, because the only two pieces of information that a bidder 
needs to follow this strategy are generally available: (1) the information whether one’s bid is 
currently  the  high  bid  of  an  auction  and  (2)  knowledge  of  which  high  bids  are  currently 
associated with each of the auctions.  Note, however, that while minimal increment bidding is 
feasible, it is hardly ever observed in online auctions. 
Given  that  bidders  use  minimal  increment  bidding, Peters  and  Severinov  (forthcoming) 
show that in equilibrium all sellers will set their reserve prices equal to their marginal costs if the 
number of traders in the market is sufficiently large.  Under these circumstances, the induced 
equilibrium of the parallel auctions market is efficient and sequentially optimal at every stage.
38 
The empirical evidence concerning parallel online auctions is mixed.  Tung, Gopal, and 
Whinston (2003) tracked simultaneous online auctions of identical consumer electronic items, 
controlling  for  seller  reputation  and  quality.    They  report  large  price  disparities  and,  hence, 
substantial arbitrage opportunities across the auctions.  They observed only a few cross-bidders, 
i.e. bidders switching from one auction to another.  Interestingly, they note that none of the cross-
bidders they identified ever succeeded to buy an item.  Furthermore, they observed that bidders 
who were outbid in one auction did not switch to another, even though their unsuccessful bid was 
substantially higher than the winning bid of the latter auction.  All this seems to indicate that 
bidding in online parallel auctions little resembles the minimal-increment bidding required in the 
equilibrium specified by Peters and Severinov (forthcoming). 
There  is,  however,  also  empirical  evidence  in  support  of  the  Peters  and  Severinov 
(forthcoming) equilibrium analysis.  Anwar, McMillan, and Zheng (2006) collected data from 
competing eBay auctions for CPUs.  Controlling for all auction parameters, three samples were 
generated, which differed only in closeness of the auctions ending times: same day, same hour, 
and same minute.  As suggested by minimal increment bidding, bidders tend to bid on the auction 
with the lowest high bid.  Furthermore, the smaller the difference between the ending times, the 
more  cross  bidding  is  observed.    Finally,  the  authors  show  that  bidders  using  cross-bidding 
                                                             
38 Burguet and Sákovics (1999) point out that efficiency breaks down in a setting in which the number of competing 
sellers is small enough to allow for strategic interaction. Examining the case of two auction sellers, who strategically 
set their reserve prices in a mutual best-response, they show that equilibrium reserve prices are well above the 
marginal cost, inefficiently excluding some bidders.     43 
strategies on average pay only 91% of the price paid by those not using cross bidding.  This 
evidence indicates that the bidders understand the strategic situation of competing auctions and 
react to it in an appropriate way.  However, the fact that bids are far from being increased at the 
smallest increment indicates that bidders do not actually employ the predicted minimal increment 
bidding.  Additionally, the price differences among auctions of identical goods seem to suggest 
that  the  observed  behavior  in  the  competing  auction  markets  does  not  perfectly  match  the 
equilibrium behavior predicted by Peters and Severinov (forthcoming). 
Stryszowska  (2005a)  takes  a  slightly  different  approach  to  competing  auctions.    She 
analyzes  two  simultaneous,  second-price,  private-value  auctions  for  an  identical  item.
39   The 
interesting twist in the derived equilibria is that bidders may use early, low, non-consequential 
bids to identify themselves and to coordinate across the auctions.  This early coordination effort 
can explain the multiple bidding that is frequently observed in online auctions.  Furthermore, 
Stryszowska (2005a) shows that in some equilibria of the game, all crucial bids arrive early, thus 
inducing an efficient allocation with identical prices in both auctions.  However, in another type 
of equilibrium, in which bidders send last minute bids, the auction outcome is inefficient and 
prices may be dispersed.  
A  completely  different  path  for modeling  the  outside  option  is  taken  by  Reiss  (2004).  
Instead of examining parallel auctions that mutually affect one another, Reiss (2004) aggregates 
whatever outside opportunity a bidder has into a simple payoff value that the bidder receives if he 
is not successful in the auction.  This payoff, for example, can represent the utility gain of buying 
the item at a posted-offer shop.  Given the model with a bidder outside option, Reiss (2004) 
shows that the optimal auction reserve price is decreases as the outside option increases.  In a 
related model, Kirchkamp, Poen and Reiss (2004) implement the bidder outside option as fixed 
payments  to  all  the  bidders  who  are  not  successful  in  the  auction.    In  the  experiments,  the 
theoretical finding that increasing the outside options decreases aggressive bidding is reproduced.  
But, the experiments also show that bidders in second-price auctions manage to fully expropriate 
their outside option, while those in the first-price auctions fail to do so.  Hence, outside options 
                                                             
39 Instead of examining two parallel auctions, some authors analyze the situation with a sequence of two auctions that 
is known to the bidder. Zeithammer (2003) shows that in such a setting, bidders will “bargain-hunt” and reduce their 
bids, if a more preferred item is next up for sale. A similar approach can be found in Reiss and Schoendube (2002) 
and Brosig and Reiss (forthcoming).    44 
seem to amplify the well-documented effect that first-price auctions generate more revenues than 
second-price auctions.  In terms of efficiency, however, neither auction type is strongly affected, 
leaving the differences between the two designs insubstantial. 
Section 7: Multi-item auctions  
With few exceptions, previous sections dealt primarily with single-item online auctions.  
However,  almost  all  online  auction  platforms  also  offer  multi-item  auction  mechanisms.    In 
recent  years,  multi-item  auctions  have  received  increasing  attention,  mainly  because  of  their 
accelerated use in B2B (business to business) commerce and government allocation procedures.  
Yet, both the theoretical and empirical literature is less developed and contains only few general 
results.  This is partly because when items are heterogeneous or bidders demand multiple items, 
new difficulties such as market power and strategic and computational complexities arise.  Here 
we present the standard auction mechanisms for selling multiple items, and we discuss some 
central intuitions as well as empirical evidence on bidding behavior.  For an in-depth overview of 
multi-item auction theory, see Milgrom (2004). 
7.1 Standard multi-unit auction mechanisms  
For selling multiple units of one item (such as car tires, financial securities, energy products, 
environmental  permits,  etc.),  there  are,  analogous  to  the  single-object  case,  four  standard 
mechanisms: the descending-price auction, the sealed-bid pay-as-bid auction, the ascending-price 
auction, and the sealed-bid uniform-price auction, plus some variations and extensions.
40 
In  the  ascending-price  multi-unit  auction,  the  price  gradually  increases  while  bidders 
indicate how many units they want at each price.  The final price is set and the auction closes 
when aggregate demand equals the number of units supplied.  All bidders pay the same final 
price, which is the price at which the auction closed.  In the corresponding sealed-bid version, 
bidders independently submit a whole demand curve.  That is, each bidder indicates how much he 
is willing to pay for the first unit he acquires, the second unit, etc.  Then, the outcome of the 
auction is determined by finding the first price at which aggregate demand equals supply.  All 
                                                             
40 All auction mechanisms considered here are simultaneous auctions; for a brief discussion of sequential auctions 
see section 8.3.    45 
bids above or equal to this price win, and bidders must pay their bid price.
41  In the sealed-bid 
uniform-price auction, all units have the same price: the market-clearing price. 
Note  that  the  ascending-price  and  the  sealed-bid,  uniform-price  mechanisms  enforce 
uniform prices for all units sold.  Other auction formats endogenously promote ‘similar prices for 
similar objects’ by encouraging arbitrage.  The best-known auction mechanism in this category is 
the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) developed by Milgrom, Wilson, and McAfee, who 
proposed the design in the context of the US radio spectrum auction.  All items, which may or 
may not be identical, are simultaneously offered in different auctions.  Bidding on all objects 
takes place simultaneously in rounds subject to an activity rule (see section 8.2).  Bidders observe 
prices throughout the auction, and this information allows them to arbitrage among substitute 
licenses, and to piece together complementary packages.  The auction ends when a round passes 
with no new bids on any licenses (see, e.g., Cramton 2002 and 2004 for more details).  For 
multiple, divisible items, Ausubel and Cramton (2004) advocate the simultaneous clock auction, 
where a price clock for each divisible good indicates its tentative price per unit quantity.  Bidders 
express the quantities desired at the current prices, and the price is then repeatedly increased by 
an  increment  until  demand  is  made  equal  to  supply,  at  which  point the  tentative  prices  and 
assignments  become  final.    This  auction  also  yields  similar  prices  for  similar  items  by 
encouraging  arbitrage.    On  the  other  hand,  the  next  two  multi-unit  auction  formats  are 
discriminatory; identical units are sold at different prices. 
In  the  decreasing-price  multi-unit  auction,  the  price  gradually  decreases  while  bidders 
indicate the price they are willing to buy one or more units.  At each price, bidders are informed 
about the supply left at that point.  The auction closes when no supply is left.  Each winner pays 
the price at which he indicated he was willing to buy.  In the sealed-bid pay-as-bid auction, 
bidders independently submit a demand curve.  Every winning bidder pays his bid for each unit, 
provided that the bid is above the clearing price. 
Another multi-unit auction with non-uniform prices was proposed in the seminal paper by 
Vickrey (1961).  Suppose there are k units for sale.  As before, the highest k bids are accepted, 
but the pricing rule of the Vickrey-auction determines that for the k
th unit awarded, bidders have 
                                                             
41 When the number of units is an integer, the clearing price may be the lowest accepted bid or the highest rejected 
bid. We also note that if the units being sold are not substitutes in the eyes of the bidders, then market clearing prices 
can fail to exist; see Milgrom (2004).   46 
to pay the amount of the kth highest losing bid.
42  This rule generalizes Vickrey’s second-price 
auction rule for the single-item auction, where the winner pays the largest losing bid, to the multi-
unit case.  In fact, analogous to the single-object case, all bidders have a dominant strategy to bid 
true values for all units. 
Search engines such as Google typically use multi-item auctions, distantly related to the 
Vickrey auction, to sell online ads.  Search results are typically shown along with sponsored links, 
which in turn are shown in decreasing order of bids.  If a user of the search engine then clicks on 
an ad in position k, that advertiser is charged by the search engine an amount equal to the next 
highest bid, i.e., the bid of an advertiser in position k + 1.  Because there are multiple positions 
available, there are many winners, and each winner pays the next highest bidder’s bid.  Edelman 
et  al.  (2005)  show  that  this  ‘generalized  second-price’  auction  generally  does  not  have  an 
equilibrium in dominant strategies.  But, it has a unique ex-post equilibrium, resulting in the same 
payoffs as the dominant strategy equilibrium of the Vickrey auction (see Varian 2006 for another 
analysis of Google’s ‘position auction’). 
7.2 Bid shading and demand reduction in multi-unit auctions 
When  bidders  do  not  demand  more than  one  unit,  the  analysis  of  the  single-item  case 
straightforwardly  generalizes.    For  instance,  bidshading  will  occur  in  sealed-bid  pay-as-bid 
auctions  (reflecting  the  trade-off  between  the  probability  of  winning  and  the  surplus  from 
winning), and ‘truth-revealing’ in the ascending-price and the uniform-price auction.  In fact, just 
as  in  the  single-item  case,  the  standard  auction  rules  are  revenue-equivalent  under  some 
appropriate  assumptions.   However,  with  multi-unit  demand,  bidding  incentives  can  be  quite 
different, and revenue equivalence fails to hold. 
Maybe the most important intuition from the literature is that uniform-price auctions do not 
share the desirable properties of the second-price auction in the single-item case.  The reason is 
that if a bidder can demand more than one unit, there is a positive probability that his bid on a 
second or later unit will be pivotal, thus determining the price for the first and possibly other 
units.  With discrete goods, the bidder will bid his true value on the first unit, but strictly less on 
                                                             
42 Suppose, e.g., that there are three bidders A, B, and C competing for three units of an object. Bidder A bids 14, 10 
and 2, bidder B bids 12, 9 and 0, and bidder C bids 8, 5 and 4, respectively. Then bidder A is awarded two units and 
bidder B one unit. Bidder A pays 17 (= 9 + 8) for both units, and bidder B pays 9 for his unit.   47 
all  subsequent  units.    As  a  consequence,  in  equilibrium,  bidders  understate  their  values,  or 
(equivalently) reduce demand quantities which hampers revenue and efficiency.
43  Furthermore, 
uniform-price auctions typically facilitate (tacit or explicit) collusion.  Suppose the bidders agree 
on  a  collusive  agreement  and  each  bidder  bids  higher  prices  for  smaller  quantities  than  his 
collusively agreed share.  Then, if any bidder attempts to obtain more, all bidders would have to 
pay high prices.  This stabilizes collusion.  So, a key concern with uniform-price auctions is the 
possibility of low price equilibria.  
Several field studies provide direct evidence of strategic demand reduction and collusive 
behavior in electronic auction markets, such as in the German auction of GSM spectrum (Grimm 
et  al.  2003),  in  the  Austrian  auction  of  third  generation  mobile  wireless  licenses  (Klemperer 
2004), in the FCC’s Nationwide Narrowband Auction (Cramton 1995), in the UK electricity 
market (Wolfram 1998), and in the California electricity market (Borenstein et al. 2002).  This 
field  evidence  is  strongly  supported  by  laboratory  evidence  (e.g.,  Kagel  and  Levin  2001, 
Engelmann and Grimm 2004) and controlled field experiments (List and Lucking-Reiley 2000).  
It has also been shown that, in line with theory, the amount of demand reduction decreases with 
the  number  of  bidders  (Engelbrecht-Wiggans  et  al.  forthcoming).  There  is,  however,  little 
research on multi-unit bidding and demand reduction in online auctions (but see the chapter by 
Morgan et al. 2005 in this Handbook on competing auction research).   
The two most common online multi-unit formats are the “Yankee auction” (as used by 
Onsale.com and also called “Multiple Item Progressive Electronic Auction”; see Bapna et al. 
2000) and eBay’s “Dutch auction” as used in the US.  Both auction mechanisms allow the seller 
to simultaneously auction off two or more units of an item.  Bidders must specify in their bid the 
price per unit and the number of units desired.  That is, unlike in the standard formats described 
above, bidders are not allowed to express a whole demand curve with prices as a function of 
quantities, but only one price-quantity-pair.  Bids are then ranked by price, then by quantity, and 
finally by the timing of the bid (earlier bids take precedence).  There is no proxy bidding.  During 
the auction, bids can be improved according to an improvement rule requiring that the pair value 
(price  times  quantity)  must  increase  with  any  new  submitted  price-quantity  pair.    The  most 
                                                             
43 This is similar to market power effects in monopsony. The ranking of the uniform-price auction and the pay-as-bid 
auction, where bidder too shade their bids, is ambiguous in both efficiency and revenue terms (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
and Kahn 1998, Ausubel and Cramton 2002).   48 
important difference between Yankee and Dutch auctions is that in Yankee auctions all winning 
bidders pay their own bids, while in Dutch auctions all winning bidders pay the same, uniform 
price, which is the lowest successful bid.
44   
7.3 Complementarities and combinatorial auctions 
Auctioning multiple items quickly becomes complicated when there are complementarities 
between items.  Complementarities exist when the value of a bundle of items is larger than the 
sum of values of each object separately.  This is the case in many applications including auctions 
for the radio spectrum, electricity, airport-landing-slot, supply chains, and transportation services.  
In such cases, a bidder may end up stuck with items that are worth little because he failed to win 
complementary items (exposure problem), or he may quit early, fearing that he may fail to win 
complementary items (holdup problem).  As a result, inefficiencies are likely to arise in multi-
item auctions where bidders cannot ensure winning complementary items.  Theory suggests that 
in these situations, a combinatorial auction, in which bidders can place bids for one or more 
packages of items, can increase revenue and efficiency.  The underlying reason is that these 
auctions allow bidders to more fully express their preferences.  Applications of combinatorial 
auctions include truckload transportation, bus routes, industrial procurement, airport arrival and 
departure slots auctions, radio spectrum auctions, and course registration at Chicago Business 
School (see Cramton et al. forthcoming and Kwasnica et al. 2005 and the references cited therein).  
The most famous combinatorial auction is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCR) mechanism, 
sometimes  called  generalized  Vickrey  auction,  which  works  as  follows.    Bidders  bid  on  all 
possible  packages.   The items  are  then  allocated  to  bidders  such  that  efficiency  (the  sum  of 
realized  values)  is  maximized  according  to  the  stated  bids.    Each  winner  pays  the  smallest 
(fictitious) bid such that he would still have won his part of the allocation.  The resulting price for 
a bidder equals the external costs (social shadow costs) of winning, in the sense that it is the 
(stated) value of the awarded package for the other bidders.  Observe that this holds analogously 
for  the  single-object  second-price  auction  introduced  in  section  2  and  Vickrey’s  multi-unit 
                                                             
44 As long as demand is smaller than supply, the price equals the seller’s reservation price.   49 
auction introduced in the last subsection.  The VCG mechanism generalizes these formats.  In 
particular, bidding one’s values for each package is a dominant strategy.
45  
However, the VCR mechanism suffers from a number of practical problems in the presence 
of complementarities that seem to seriously limit its usefulness for many applications (Ausubel 
and Milgrom 2004).
46  One is that the VCG mechanism does not maximize revenues.  In fact, 
revenues can be very low when items are not substitutes though competition is substantial.  This 
alone disqualifies the auction for many purposes.
47  Furthermore, the VCG mechanism makes it 
easy for losing bidders to collude, and individual bidders can sometimes profit from bidding 
under pseudonyms – something that appears to be particularly problematic for online auctions, 
where identities can be more easily manipulated.  Another problem is computational complexity.  
The  number  of  potential  bids  per  bidder  is  exponentially  growing  with  the  number  of  items 
auctioned.  There are 2
N – 1 packages of N items. Bidding on all packages can be too demanding 
for  human  bidders,  even  though  the  VCG  mechanism  removes  all  strategic  complexity  by 
implementing dominant strategies.  Computational complexity is also an issue for the auctioneer.  
Finding the efficiency (or revenue) maximizing allocation of objects in a general combinatorial 
auction is difficult (more precisely: NP-hard; see de Vries and Vohra 2003), though researchers 
succeeded in demonstrating that the ‘winner determination’ problem can often be reasonably 
addressed (e.g., Rothkopf et al. 1998, Sandholm et al. 2005).  Finally, it has been shown that no 
general equivalent of the VCG mechanism exists in common-value environments, and second-
best mechanisms have not yet been identified (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001).  
That said, there has been much progress in practical multi-object auction design in recent 
years.  Much of the literature focuses on open, progressive auctions, which can reduce strategic 
and computational complexity.  Some researchers argue, based on applied research in electricity 
and  other  infrastructure  industry  markets, that when  complementarities  are  weak  and  do  not 
strongly differ across bidders, auction formats like the simultaneous ascending auction may work 
                                                             
45 Bidders  must  be  risk-neutral  and  are  not  allowed  to  face  binding  budget  constraints.  Ausubel  (forthcoming) 
developed an open auction version of the VCG mechanism. Another well-known combinatorial auction is the pay-as-
bid package auction by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), which is relatively easy and transparent, but strategically 
much more complex, as it is typically the case with pay-as-bid auction formats. 
46 Maskin (2005) entertains a more positive picture of the potential practical importance of the VCG mechanism.  
47 General results about revenue maximizing auction mechanisms in the private-value multi-object environment do 
not exist.   50 
satisfactorily,  even  though  they  do  not  allow  combinatorial  bids  (e.g.,  Ausubel  and  Cramton 
2004).  A well-known progressive auction format that includes combinatorial bidding features is 
Banks et al.’s (1989) continuous-package bid auction that tries to reduce both value and strategic 
computation  (see  Kwasnica  et  al.  2005  for  a  recent  advancement  of  this  format).    Another 
interesting  format  to  deal  with  complementarities  is  the  ascending-proxy  auction  (Ausubel, 
Cramton and Milgrom forthcoming).  This is a hybrid auction that begins with a simple and 
transparent clock phase, not unlike the simultaneous-clock auction, and that ends with a final 
proxy auction round based on package bids.  Similar to eBay’s proxy bidding system, bidders in 
the  proxy  phase  submit  values  to  an  artificial  proxy  agent  who  then  bids  on  their  behalf  to 
maximize profits.  It can be shown that including such a proxy phase may handle many of the 
complications that we discussed above, including the exposure problem.  
Some experimental studies, starting with Banks et al. (1989; see also Ledyard et al. 1997, 
and  Plott  1997),  investigate  bidding  when  complementarities  are  present.    However,  to  our 
knowledge, the only experimental paper that relates its design directly to online auctions is Katok 
and Roth (2004).  They compared the performance of an auction designed to resemble eBay’s 
multi-unit “Dutch” auction to the descending-price auction.  The laboratory setting used a set of 
value  environments  that  include  more  or  less  strong  complementarities  among  homogenous 
objects.  Overall, eBay’s ascending Dutch auction performed relatively poorly because of the 
exposure problem.  Recall that while the eBay mechanism guarantees a uniform price for all units, 
it does not guarantee a winning bidder the entire quantity on which he bids.  On the other hand, 
the descending Dutch auction avoids the exposure problem because a bidder who stops the clock 
obtains  the  full  quantity  he  desires  at  the  price  he  stopped  the  auction.    In  this  sense,  the 
descending Dutch auction can be interpreted as a simple version of a combinatorial auction in 
case of homogeneous goods.  Katok and Roth (2004) conclude that eBay’s Dutch auction is 
susceptible to the exposure problem in environments with synergies, but they also mention that 
synergies may not be very relevant for B2C and C2C auctions such as eBay.  We add that eBay 
gives  winners  the  right  to  refuse  to  purchase  ‘partial  quantities’–  a  rule  that  has  not  been 
accounted for in the experiment.  That is, if a bidder only wins some of the desired object, he 
does not have to buy any of them.  This rule is meant to protect eBay users from the exposure 
problem  (but  might  create  other  strategic  complications  as  we  will  briefly  note  in  the  next 
section).   51 
Section 8: Design of online auctions 
Auction design matters. In the previous sections, we have shown that the choice of the 
auction format, the reservation price, the buy-it-now price and other auction parameters may 
systematically  and  significantly  affect  revenue,  efficiency  and  bidder  participation.    In  this 
section, we discuss some further auction mechanism choices relevant to online auctions, which 
have been studied in the literature.
 48 
8.1 The advantages of long, open auctions 
Unlike offline auctions that typically last only a few minutes, Internet auctions such as 
those on eBay, Yahoo and Amazon last many days.
49  Since bidders may enter an auction from 
anywhere, and at anytime, a longer auction time allows more bidders to spot an item and bid on it.  
Lucking-Reiley et al. (1999) and Hasker et al. (2004) observed that longer auction durations on 
eBay tend to attract more bidders and lead to higher prices.  Lucking-Reiley et al. (1999) reported 
that 7-day auction prices are approximately 24 percent higher than shorter auctions, and 10-day 
auctions are 42 percent higher, on average. Hasker et al. (2004) observed that the change in the 
final sales price achieved by extending the auction from three to ten days is about 10.9 percent.
50  
Long durations also create challenges because bidders cannot be expected to continually 
monitor the auctions.  Many auction houses, including eBay, respond to this by providing bidders 
with artificial proxy agents.  These agents bid on the bidders’ behalf, automatically responding as 
other bids come in, and thus free bidders from the necessity of following the auctions and the 
price discovery process themselves. 
A related important design question is whether the auction should be conducted by sealed-
bid.   That  is,  should  bidders  submit  their  (proxy)  bids  over  an  extended  period  of  time,  but 
without the opportunity to react to the bidding activity of other human or proxy bidders, or should 
bidding  be  open,  so  that  bidders  can  see  how  bidding  activity  evolves  during  the  course  of 
                                                             
48 For the question how to promote trust and trustworthiness in online auctions by clever design choices, see e.g. 
Dellarocas (this Handbook), as well as Brosig et al. (2003), Bolton et al. (2004a,b, forthcoming), Güth et al. (2005), 
among many others. 
49 Google’s and Yahoo’s auctions of online ads are even always accepting bids. 
50 Hasker  et al. (2004) also reported that  experienced sellers respond  to these incentives  in  that they sell  more 
valuable objects in longer auctions. Simonsohn (2005) found, on the other hand, that too many sellers set their 
auctions to end during peak-demand hours such that the probability of sale during such hours is actually lower.   52 
auction?  This way, bidders would retain the right to change (proxy) bids in response to the bid 
history.
51  Many online auction houses, such as eBay, chose an open format.  From a theoretical 
point of view, open ascending-price auctions tend to reduce the force of the ‘winner’s curse’ in 
environments with a common-value element, because the competitors’ bidding activities may 
convey  relevant  information  that the  bidders  use  in  revising  their  estimates  of  value.   Thus, 
uncertainty is reduced and so is the winner’s curse, and bidders can bid more aggressively.  This, 
in turn, can result in higher revenues in open auctions (see Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the 
theory and Klemperer (1999) for a more precise intuition behind the effect).  Recently, Compte 
and  Jehiel  (2004)  showed  that  open  auctions  are  also  the  preferred  choice  in  private-value 
environments, if the bidders do not know ones’ value a priori.  So the rationale for using open 
formats appear quite robust across auction models. 
 On the other hand, note that such results, derived in simple auction models, cannot directly 
be applied to online auctions.  One characteristic of eBay is that bidders can enter and leave the 
auction at any point they wish.  So bidding activity, or non-activity, has less information value 
than  in  the  ascending-price  auction  described  above,  in  which  entry  and  exit  decisions  are 
perfectly observable.  Yet, the fact that bidders condition their behavior on others’ activities (see, 
e.g., sections 3 and 4) suggests that open online auctions reveal some helpful information.  
Another argument for open auction formats comes from laboratory experiments.  It has 
been shown that the feedback delivered in open second-price auctions such as eBay substantially 
accelerates  the  speed  of  learning  compared  to  second-price  sealed-bid  auctions (Ariely  et  al. 
forthcoming).    This  improves  the  price  discovery  process  and  increases  competition  among 
bidders  so  that  efficiency  and  revenues  can  be  enhanced,  even  in  purely  private-value 
environments.  In line with this finding, Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) report that, when 
having the choice between sealed-bid and open, ascending-bid auctions, laboratory subjects in a 
private-value environment have a strong preference for the open format.  Finally, Cramton (1998) 
notes that in practical applications, the dynamic price-discovery process of an open auction most 
often does a better job than sealed bidding.  This is, of course, in particular true in multi-object 
auctions, where the dynamics facilitate arbitrage and packaging.  
                                                             
51 We assume here that the open auction is ascending.    53 
However, there are also disadvantages that come with open bidding.  Open auctions are 
more  susceptible  to  various  forms  of  collusion  and  fraud.    Bapna  (2003)  argues  that  open 
auctions facilitate collusive bidding against a repeat seller (and has other more technological 
disadvantages).  He therefore recommends that eBay run sealed-bid auctions.  The literature on 
spectrum auctions, however, demonstrated that certain auction design features can address and 
mitigate many of these problems.  For instance, a history of bids that conceals bidder identities 
can, to some extent, suppress bidder collusion against sellers and rival bidders.
52  Furthermore, 
the anonymity and the number of potential bidders, as well as free entry in online auctions, seem 
to make coordination, signaling and communication among bidders
 more difficult than in many 
offline auction environments.  
Other concerns are probably more justified: Open auctions can lead to lower revenues when 
bidders are risk-averse (as we mentioned in section 2), and when ex-ante asymmetries among 
bidders are strong or competition is weak (e.g., Cramton 1998).  This might be part of the reason 
why eBay recently introduced a sealed-bid format as an option for sellers; in the ‘best offer’ 
format, bidders can make sealed-bids, and sellers can accept any bid at any time they wish. 
8.2. Controlling the pace of bidding 
As we have seen in section 4, bidders in eBay auctions tend to bid late.  This may distort 
the virtues of long, open auctions described above.  One way to avoid late bidding and to control 
the pace of auctions is to create pressure on bidders to bid actively from the start.  Milgrom and 
Wilson designed an activity rule that was applied to the U.S. spectrum auctions (McAfee and 
McMillan 1996).  The activity rule requires a bidder to be ‘active’ (that is to be the current high 
bidder or to submit new bids) on a predetermined number of spectrum licenses.  If a bidder falls 
short of the required activity level, the number of licenses it is eligible to buy shrinks.  Thus, 
bidders are prevented from holding back.  However, activity rules of this sort are incompatible 
with the flexibility needed on global auction platforms. 
Roth and Ockenfels (2002) observed that the rule by which online auctions end may have a 
substantial  effect  on  the  timing  of  bids  and  price  discovery.    On  eBay,  auctions  end  at  a 
predetermined time: a ‘hard close’.  In contrast, Amazon emulates the ‘Going, Going, Gone’ 
                                                             
52 See Klemperer (2004) for a review of design recommendations for the  European spectrum  auctions to avoid 
collusive behavior.    54 
feature of traditional auction houses. That is, Amazon automatically extends an auction if a bid 
comes in late, so that all bidders always have the opportunity to respond to the opponents’ bids.
53 
Ockenfels  and  Roth  (forthcoming)  show  that,  although  the risks  of  last-minute  bidding 
remain, the strategic advantages of last-minute bidding are eliminated or severely attenuated in 
Amazon-style auctions.  That is, a bidder who waits to bid until the last seconds of the auction 
still runs the risk that his bid will not successfully be transmitted in time.  However, if his bid is 
successfully transmitted, the auction will be extended for ten minutes, so that, no matter how late 
the bid was placed, other bidders will have time to respond.  Thus on Amazon, an attentive 
incremental bidder, for example, can respond whenever a bid is placed.
54  The differences in the 
strategic  environment  are  reflected  in  the  data  of  Roth  and  Ockenfels  (2002):  There  is 
significantly more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon.  For instance, 40 percent of eBay-
computer auctions and 59 percent of eBay-antiques auctions in the sample have last bids in the 
closing 5 minutes, compared to about 3 percent of both Amazon computer and Amazon antiques 
auctions that have last bids in the final five minutes before the initially scheduled deadline or 
later.  Further analysis reveals that while the impact of the bidders’ feedback numbers on late 
bidding  is  significantly  positive  in  eBay,  it  is  negative  in  Amazon,  suggesting  that  more 
experienced bidders on eBay bid later than less experienced bidders, but experience in Amazon 
has the opposite effect.  
Experiments  by  Ariely  et  al.  (forthcoming)  replicate  these  findings  in  a  controlled 
laboratory private-value setting in which the only difference between auctions is the ending rule.  
The experiment thus controls for differences other than the closing rule that might affect behavior 
on Amazon and eBay, such as the number of auctions being conducted at a time and the number 
of potential bidders.  The experiment also demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, ‘early’ prices on 
Amazon are an increasingly good predictor for final prices, whereas price discovery on eBay 
                                                             
53 In Amazon’s own words: “We know that bidding can get hot and heavy near the end of many auctions. Our Going, 
Going, Gone feature ensures that you always have an opportunity to challenge last-second bids. Here's how it works: 
Whenever a bid is cast in the last 10 minutes of an auction, the auction is automatically extended for an additional 10 
minutes from the time of the latest bid. This ensures that an auction can't close until 10 minutes have passed with no 
further bids.” On Yahoo’s auction platform, the seller decides whether he wishes a hard or a soft close. Otherwise, all 
three platforms employ similar auction rules. 
54 However, there are other, non-strategic reasons for late bidding, including procrastination, use of search engines 
that make it easy to find auctions about to end, endowment effects, or management of bidding in multiple auctions in 
which  similar  objects  may  be  offered.  These  motives  for  late  bidding  should  be  relatively  unaffected  by  the 
difference in closing rules between eBay and Amazon.    55 
became increasingly frenzied.  Simulation experiments by Duffy and Ünver (2005) with artificial 
adaptive agents who can update their strategies via a genetic algorithm, replicate these findings 
and thus provide another robustness check. 
Controlled field experiments, on the other hand, seem to have more difficulties finding 
evidence for the impact of the ending rule.  Brown and Morgan (2005) and Houser and Wooders 
(2005) took advantage of the fact that Yahoo sellers are allowed to choose whether to end the 
auction with a hard or a soft close.  In both studies, identical items were sold using both ending 
rules.  None of these studies found a significant effect of the ending rule on the amount of late 
bidding.
55  However, Houser and Wooders (2005) observed – as Ariely et al. (forthcoming) and 
Duffy and Ütku (2005) – that, ceteris paribus, hard-close auctions tend to raise less revenue than 
soft-close auctions.
56  
Online market design also includes the design of artificial agents, such as eBay’s ‘proxy 
bidder’.  Because late bidding involves a good deal of planning and effort, artificial agents can 
also help executing late-bidding strategies.  In fact, there is a market for artificial sniping agents 
that will allow a bidder not only to submit a proxy bid, but also to do so at the last moment.  
Sniping agents take two forms: downloadable programs that run on the bidder’s own computer, 
and web-based services like esnipe.com to which a bidder can subscribe.  Both offer bidders the 
ability to choose their maximum bid early in the auction, record when the auction is scheduled to 
end, and decide how many minutes or seconds before the end of the auction the sniping agent 
should submit the bid.  
Recall that whether the timing of bids matters depends on the rules of the game.  Artificial 
last-minute bidding agents (like esnipe.com) might support human bidders in eBay auctions, but 
they would hardly help on Amazon, where the closing rule removes or greatly attenuates the 
incentives to snipe.  By the same token, human bidders on Amazon have more reason to make 
use of the proxy bidding agent provided by the auction houses than bidders on eBay, where the 
fixed  deadline  may  create  incentives  to  submit  the  bid  late,  depending  on  other  (human  or 
                                                             
55 In a recent laboratory experiment, in which three sudden termination variants of hard-close auction (a.k.a. candle 
auction) were examined, Füllbrunn and Sadrieh (2006) find that the extent of late-bidding crucially depends on the 
first stage in which the probability of sudden termination is greater than zero. 
56 In a theoretic model of sequential auctions, Stryszowska (2005b) identified a situation in which soft-close auctions 
should be expected to yield smaller revenues.   56 
artificial) bidders’ behavior.  Thus, how well different kinds of artificial agents perform depends 
on how the auction rules are designed.  
Note also, that as sniping by human and artificial agents become more widespread on eBay, 
eBay will be gradually transformed into a sealed-bid second-price auction.  If a large part of the 
late bidding activity takes place on third party sites like esnipe.com, eBay faces a number of 
design and rule choices; one is to ban sniping services.  In fact, eBay.de (Germany) banned third 
party sniping services in its general terms and conditions (which is, of course, difficult to enforce), 
because, according to them, bidders who use sniping services have an "unfair advantage" over 
people who bid manually.  A second choice would be just the opposite: recapturing the sniping 
market by offering a sniping option on eBay itself.  Under this option, last minute bids submitted 
in advance directly to eBay could all be counted at the same time, immediately after the auction 
close.  This would give bidders certainty, both that their bids would be successfully transmitted, 
and that there would be no time for other bidders to react.  Of course, if all bidders used this 
option, the auction becomes a sealed-bid auction (Ockenfels and Roth 2002).  As we have argued 
above,  eBay  might  prefer  not  to  encourage  this  development  towards  sealed-bids,  given  the 
advantages of open auctions, yet even now,  eBay is considering a sniping service that would 
enable last-minute bidding via phone (http://www.unwiredbuyer.com/).  While bidding by phone 
will still involve risks that the bid fails to successfully register, it will likely further increase the 
number of snipes.  Finally, eBay could consider changing the ending rule of the auction to a soft 
close.  This, however, may also cause adverse effects such as lowering the entertainment value of 
eBay.
57 
There is at least one other design choice influencing auction design: the speed of the price 
clock in decreasing-price auctions.  As we mentioned in section 2, Lucking-Reiley (1999) found 
                                                             
57 Ockenfels (2003) noted that online negotiation sites that promise dispute resolution (such as e-commerce disputes 
and traditional litigation) via electronic and standardized communication have to deal with related design problems. 
One of the more prominent online negotiation sites, clicknsettle.com, experimented in 1999 with round-by-round 
demands and offers. But this format did not prove to be effective, because a deadline effect similar to what has been 
observed on eBay and to what has been observed in experimental bargaining games (Roth et al. 1988) hindered 
efficient negotiations: “After reviewing the early results with our clients, we discovered that in most negotiations, the 
first two rounds were being ‘wasted’ and the disputing parties really only had one opportunity to settle the case, the 
final round.”  (http://www.clicknsettle.com/onlinenegmodel.cfm  2003).  EBay  also  works  together  with  a  dispute 
resolution provider. A recent study by Brett et al. (2005) investigated the time it takes to resolve a dispute in an on-
line  setting.  By  analysing  582  eBay-generated  disputes  they  find  that  the  opening  moves  can  be  critical  in 
accelerating or delaying resolution to disputants.    57 
that in a controlled field study of online auctions, the single-item descending-price format yields 
higher revenues than corresponding sealed-bid auctions – just the opposite of what has been 
found in some laboratory experiments (Cox et al. 1982, 1983).  Lucking-Reiley observed that his 
descending-price auctions took much longer than the experiments and speculated that the higher 
revenues are because bidders may be impatient to complete their purchase, or having more time 
allows bidders to more accurately determine their value of the item.  These ideas are supported in 
a laboratory experiment by Katok and Kwasnica (2004).  In descending-price auctions with a fast 
clock, revenue turned out to be significantly lower, and with a slow clock significantly higher, 
than in the corresponding sealed-bid version.  As the authors show, this bidding pattern is in line 
with  a  simple  model  of  impatient  bidders.    Carare  and  Rothkopf  (2005)  come  to  similar 
conclusions in both a decision-theoretic and game-theoretic model that incorporates a ‘cost of 
returning to the auction site’.  Bidders prefer to bid sooner, yielding higher prices, when the cost 
is higher.  These results suggest that, without seller competition and without impatience on the 
side of the seller, sellers would prefer to implement a slow clock rather than a fast clock, or a 
sealed-bid mechanism.  We are not aware of any online auction that allows a choice like this, but 
eBay’s  buy-it-now  option  may  be  a  substitute  choice,  because  it  gives  impatient  bidders  the 
opportunity to immediately end the auction at a higher price. 
8.3 Design aspects in multi-unit auctions 
There are potentially many ways to sell multiple items in online auctions.  One way is to 
sell them simultaneously or sequentially in a series of single-object auctions.  Another way is to 
sell them through a single auction, tailored to selling multiple units.  The latter approach has 
several advantages.  For one, selling multiple units through one auction can reduce transaction 
costs for both buyers and sellers.  Second, simultaneous and sequential auctions impose strategic 
complexities and coordination problems on bidders, because bidders must guess prices of the 
other objects in order to realize arbitrage and to efficiently package objects.  Wrong guessing 
may hamper revenue and efficiency (Milgrom 2004, Cramton 2004).  
Laboratory and field studies of sequential auctions strongly support this view.  For instance, 
sequential  auctions  typically  fail  to  generate  similar  prices  for  similar  items.    Rather,  prices 
display a downward drift.  This phenomenon is called ‘declining price anomaly’ (Ashenfelter 
1989).  One possible explanation is related to the winner’s curse: those bidders who win the early 
units are those who overestimated the prices realized in later auctions.  Related problems arise in   58 
simultaneous eBay auctions.  Since eBay bidders have only weak incentives to contribute to the 
price discovery process early in the auction – especially in the presence of simultaneous, multiple 
listings of identical items – the decision where and what to bid is complex and may lead to 
random or erroneous entry decisions close to the ending time.  The result is coordination failure.  
Stryszowska  (2005a,b,c)  investigated  coordination  (failure)  in  simultaneous,  overlapping  and 
sequential Internet auctions. 
In  principle,  multi-unit  auction  formats,  such  as  eBay’s  “Dutch”  auction,  diminish 
coordination problems by reducing the number of auctions.  They also enforce uniform prices for 
identical objects, reducing the risk associated with price dispersion.  However, details in the 
design matter.  Ockenfels (2005) noted that even in the simplest case of unit-demand, the price 
rule of eBay’s “Dutch” auction makes bidding much more complicated than in the single-object 
auction.  Assuming that no bidder demands more than one unit, the ‘natural’ extension of eBay’s 
second-price single-object auction mechanism is the Vickrey auction described earlier, in which 
the final price is equal to the highest losing bid (plus a small increment).  Facing Vickrey’s price 
rule,  bidders  should  ‘sooner  or  later’  just  bid  their  values,  independent  of  the  other  bidders’ 
behavior.  In eBay’s “Dutch” auction, however, the final price is equal to the lowest winning bid, 
so that one of the winners will eventually determine the price.  This creates incentives for bid 
shading.  Specifically, winners can minimize the price paid by not bidding more than a small 
increment  above  the  highest  losing  bid.
58   But,  because  the  highest  losing  bid  is  usually  not 
known before the auction is over, the outcome of the auction again depends on the accurateness 
of the bidders’ estimations.  In fact, Ockenfels (2005) found more bid shading in eBay’s “Dutch” 
auction than in eBay’s single-object auction in a controlled field experiment on eBay. 
These kinds of arguments convinced eBay Germany to change the multi-unit format in the 
summer of 2005.  The multi-unit auction format is now called “multi-auction” and to a large 
extent is analogous to the single-object auction.  Most importantly, there is now proxy bidding 
(proxy  bids  are  concealed  to  other  bidders),  and  the  price  equals  the  highest  losing  bid  – 
analogous to the single-object format.  However, there are other issues with eBay’s multi-unit 
auction  having  to  do  with  the  fact  that  neither  the  old,  nor  the  new  format  avoid  demand 
reduction and exposure problems for multi-unit demand.  We believe that designing a robust 
                                                             
58 In the single-object auction, finding this price is the job of the proxy bidder.   59 
multi-unit auction that takes complex preferences and incentives of the bidders into account is 
still an important challenge for online auctions.  The slight changes in Germany are moving in the 
right direction. 
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